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1Foreword
This Dean’s Report celebrates our law school’s storied past. Over the past 125 years, Chicago-Kent has graduated students who would later become leading jurists, trial lawyers, and heads of corporations 
and not-for-profits, not only here in the United States but around the world. 
Graduates have also served as governors, as members of Congress, as legal 
service lawyers, and in a wide variety of other public interest capacities.
In our first generation, we proudly opened our doors to minorities who 
were denied a legal education elsewhere. And we have contributed to legal 
education with a series of innovations, from introducing computers into 
legal instruction to developing the first three-year required curriculum for 
legal writing, and from establishing the first fee-generating clinical program 
in the nation to launching an incubator for recent graduates interested in 
practicing law on their own. Our programs in intellectual property, advo-
cacy, and law and the workplace have few peers.
We also have been blessed with fabulous faculty members, a number of 
whom have marked the occasion of our anniversary by exploring some of the 
continuities and discontinuities in the legal terrain spanning the lifetime of 
the school. I trust you will enjoy their musings, and I look forward to work-
ing with all of you as we embark on the next, even-more-terrific 125 years.
Dean Harold J. Krent

3Introduction
When students entered the chambers of Judge Joseph Meade Bailey in 1888 for the educational adventure that was later to become known as Chicago-Kent College of Law, they were surrounded 
by volumes of legal cases, but finding precedents was hit or miss since no one 
had yet created an indexing system. Chatter inside the chambers might have 
centered on the infamous “Great Boodle Trial,” one of the first public corrup-
tion trials in Chicago, or the new Rookery Building being built just a block 
north on LaSalle Street. More serious discussion might have turned to basic 
questions about the Constitution and the highest court of the land. Should 
the Bill of Rights be applied to the States? Should everyone have the right to 
have their cases heard by the U.S. Supreme Court?
Outside the judge’s chambers, students were faced with a world of new 
technologies (the telegram, the portable camera, skyscraping architecture) 
and fast-evolving legal questions. Rapid industrialization and the monopo-
listic tendencies of major enterprises, particularly the railroads centered in 
the Midwest, were pushing Congress towards the passage of a pathbreaking 
“anti-trust” law. Women were permitted to enroll in the early law classes held 
in Judge Bailey’s chambers, and they were increasingly involved in providing 
legal aid to the poor through the Protective Agency for Women and Children 
but were denied the right to sit on juries. And while Albert Goodwill Spal-
ding, owner of the Chicago White Stockings, and John Montgomery Ward, 
the nation’s most famous shortstop, were battling over player labor issues, 
post–Civil War tensions were still simmering in a scandalous case that pitted 
California against the President.
 Since those early classes in the late nineteenth century, IIT Chicago-Kent 
graduates have mastered the law and served their clients in all 50 states and 
around the world. They have joined big firms, formed their own firms, cre-
ated businesses, been appointed to the bench, served as legislators, argued 
in the Supreme Court, joined the media, and won awards for their ideas and 
their representation. They have changed the law and changed the world. And 
now, 125 years after the law school was founded, we celebrate the tenacity 
and success of this great Chicago institution and its alumni with tales span-
ning 125 years of law and change.
Professors Lori Andrews and Sarah Harding
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In late August 1887, as some of Chicago-Kent College of Law’s first students were beginning 
their studies in the chambers of 
Judge Joseph Bailey, a bottle carrying 
a handwritten note bobbed across 
Lake Michigan. Found on the shores 
of Grand Haven, Michigan, the bot-
tle and its contents were rushed to 
a reporter for the then-fledgling 
Chicago Daily Tribune newspaper. 
Thrilled to have scooped the com-
petition, the Tribune published the 
note the next day as an exclusive:
To my friends in Chicago: A 
few more hours and I will be safe 
through the straits and in Canada.
Sheriff Matson, please accept my 
thanks for the bath, but I have 
concluded it in British waters. Oh 
Ed, I wish you were here with me! 
Goodbye till we meet!
The note’s author was William 
J. McGarigle, and he had reason to 
gloat. A former Cook County Com-
missioner and warden of the Cook 
County Hospital, McGarigle had 
successfully fled police custody af-
ter being convicted on corruption 
charges and sentenced to three years 
in prison. McGarigle escaped by 
duping the Sheriff of Cook County, 
Canute Matson, into allowing him a 
visit with his wife and kids at their 
CHICAGO’S “GREAT BOODLE TRIAL”
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“The Boodle Aldermen: Each sat in his particular oven,” cartoon by Art Young, 1892.
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Lakeview home. After asking to take 
a bath to “freshen up,” McGarigle 
slipped out a window, made his 
way to a schooner docked along the 
south branch of the Chicago River, 
and sailed out into the lake and 
through the Straits of Mackinaw to 
Canadian waters.
Slipping past the patrol boats, 
knowing he was about to be a free 
man (Canada had no extradition 
treaty with the U.S. at the time), Mc-
Garigle must have chuckled as he 
threw the bottle overboard. When 
found, the note would not only put 
a thorn in the backside of Matson 
and the entire sheriff ’s office, but it 
would surely put a smile on the face 
of his friend, Edward McDonald. 
The “Ed” from the note, McDonald 
was McGarigle’s co-defendant, fel-
low county commissioner, and now 
former cellmate. Keeping McDonald 
in good spirits hadn’t been easy as 
the summer humidity in their cells 
climbed and a transfer to the Joliet 
Penitentiary loomed, but McGarigle 
did his best. The truth was, Ed Mc-
Donald’s happiness mattered. As a 
longtime board member and the 
Cook County Hospital’s engineer, 
he knew every detail of the swin-
dles that landed them and the other 
county commissioners in jail. But 
more importantly, he was brother to 
Michael “Big Mike” or “King Mike” 
McDonald, boss of the Chicago 
Democratic Machine and the city’s 
first politician gangster.
McGarigle, Ed McDonald, and 
Big Mike McDonald form the nu-
cleus of a fantastic story of proudly 
corrupt politicians, seemingly righ-
teous reformers, bagmen, kidnap-
pers, and suckered citizens, revealed 
through the testimony of the “Great 
Boodle Trial” of 1887. The “most 
sensational corruption scandal of 
the late nineteenth century,” the 
Boodle Trial offers a glimpse into 
the crooked machine politics of 
early Chicago and the equally un-
derhanded tactics of overzealous 
reformers. Called by some a “correc-
tive antidote” to “[a]n epidemic of 
fraud,” the trial helped galvanize the 
reform movement in Chicago, prov-
ing that even well-connected Chi-
cago politicians could be brought to 
justice. At the same time, it demon-
strated the lengths—some say nec-
essary; others say illegal—reform-
ers would go in the pursuit of their 
goals. Finally, the trial reminds us of 
just how entrenched corruption is in 
Chicago politics. As dramatic as it 
was at the time, the trial may have 
been the beginning, not the end, of 
Chicago’s legacy of corruption.
Chicago’s Great Boodle Trial, which began on June 4, 1887, was 
actually two “prolonged and tedious 
trials.” The first trial pitted State’s 
Attorney Julius Grinnell against 
McGarigle and Ed McDonald; the 
second was against over a dozen 
other commissioners and private 
contractors in an “omnibus” pro-
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ceeding. Both cases centered around 
the same allegations of public cor-
ruption. According to prosecutors, a 
ring of crooked commissioners took 
control of the Cook County Board 
sometime in the early 1880s. If a 
company wanted to do business with 
the county, it had to pay the ring a 
“commission” for the privilege. 
What we today call a “pay to play” 
scheme, this arrangement allowed 
dishonest commissioners and busi-
ness owners to get rich off county 
contracts secured through bribes 
and inflated by padded invoices. Ed 
McDonald helped organize the ring 
and set up the schemes, while Mc-
Garigle, acting as the bagman, col-
lected the bribes and kickbacks—the 
“boodle.” Everything led back to Big 
Mike McDonald, the man who con-
trolled Chicago’s Democratic Party, 
all county patronage, and the county 
board.   
A sampling of the boodlers and 
their schemes, recounted in vivid 
detail through the two trials, shows 
the power of early Chicago machine 
politics and the depth of the com-
missioners’ individual greed. There 
was Harry “Prince Hal” Varnell, 
a gambler and saloon owner ap-
pointed warden of the Cook County 
Insane Asylum. Varnell promptly set 
up a private office and home on the 
grounds of the asylum and outfit-
ted them with “Persian rugs, Brus-
sels carpets, and lace curtains.” He 
ordered expensive foods and paid 
for the living expenses of his neph-
ews, cousins, and friends, all using 
taxpayer money. The asylum’s drug 
store and infirmary served as the 
“clubhouse” for the ring of com-
missioners.
James “Buck” McCarthy joined 
the county board in 1884. A high 
school dropout, former boxer, and 
meat packer in the Chicago stock-
yards, McCarthy’s main qualification 
for being a commissioner was his 
friendship with Big Mike McDon-
ald. McCarthy’s protégé was Charles 
Lynn, who served as a deputy sheriff 
and commissioner. Lynn admitted 
to joining the board “solely for the 
money he could extort,” recounting 
his “scorn” for Chicago industrialists 
who refused to pay the ring its ex-
pected commissions. Charles Frey, 
another McDonald-controlled com-
missioner, was warden of the county 
poorhouse. He bought silk under-
wear costing eighty-five dollars, 
charging it to the county as a bale of 
muslin.    
And then there was McGarigle. 
Warden of the county’s 600-bed hos-
pital for the poor, McGarigle’s office 
was adorned in the finest imported 
damask drapes. China spittoons 
flanked his office door. He even had 
a private horse stable built on hospi-
tal grounds for his personal use. In 
one of the more farcical accounts, it 
was reported that McGarigle had 24 
lightning rods mounted on a hospi-
tal tool shed—one “on every chim-
ney, every alcove, every corner, and 
every crevice.” The lightning rods 
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were installed by Varnell, a business 
agent of the manufacturer.
As the boodlers siphoned off tax 
dollars to fund their lavish offices 
and private dinners, county patients 
suffered. In the Cook County Hos-
pital’s contagious disease ward, “a 
cramped, fetid, 18-by-40-foot room,” 
patients fought for space on only 
six beds, often lying side by side on 
the floor. Unlike the $3.00-a-dozen 
strawberries and grapes Varnell or-
dered for his party guests at the club-
house, patients were served spoiled 
meat. The nurses and orderlies often 
showed up to work drunk. Similar 
conditions were found at the asylum 
and the poorhouse. Newspapers re-
ported that “the poor, the lunatics, 
and the sick have fared none too 
well, but those who have been hired 
to take care of them live in luxury.”
Not surprisingly, the boodlers’ largess eventually garnered 
notice. In 1886, the county budget 
faced a staggering one million dollar 
deficit (approximately 25 million in 
today’s dollars), which was directly 
tied to the reckless spending of the 
corrupt commissioners. This rallied 
the few reform-minded commis-
sioners on the county board, includ-
ing J. Frank Aldrich, who was also a 
member of the reform-based Union 
League Club of Chicago. The Union 
League Club joined causes with the 
Citizens’ Association, another re-
form group, whose membership in-
cluded George Pullman, one of the 
wealthiest and most powerful in-
dustrialists in the country. Pullman 
and the other reformers brought suit 
against the county board to enjoin 
it from entering into more dubious 
Several men sitting on benches along a hallway in the Cook County Hospital, 1911, DN-0008937, Chicago 
Daily News negatives collection, Chicago History Museum.
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contracts—the first was to drill an 
unnecessary artisan well at the poor-
house—thereby beginning the “re-
form movement in county affairs.”      
Despite the laudable goal of 
ending the “epidemic of fraud” in 
county politics, the reformers were 
not exactly above reproach in their 
tactics. In fact, some of the reform-
ers’ methods rivaled those of the 
boodlers. After filing their civil 
suit, the reformers funded a private 
prosecution of the ring of com-
missioners. Of the $150,000 raised 
(over three and a half million dol-
lars today), at least $30,000 went to 
the Mooney and Boland Detective 
Agency for the purpose of review-
ing county invoices and conducting 
nonstop surveillance of county con-
tractors suspected of paying bribes. 
When the invoices the detectives 
had access to didn’t show evidence of 
bribes, the reformers had ones that 
did stolen from a county safe. The 
“confiscated” documents helped lead 
to a raid on the commissioners’ club-
house, which uncovered additional in-
criminating evidence. 
Now all the reformers needed 
was a witness. A corrupt contrac-
tor, a plumber named Nic Schnei-
der, gave the reformers what they 
were after. Drinking one night at Big 
Mike McDonald’s four-story Clark 
Street gambling parlor and saloon, 
“The Store,” Schneider loudly toasted 
to “county contracts,” saying, “I am 
rich and by gracious in two years I 
shall be as rich as anybody.” Joining 
him in the toast was a county com-
missioner. Two Mooney and Boland 
detectives, who had been surveilling 
Schneider, witnessed the toast. 
When Schneider left the tavern, the 
detectives followed. Schneider never 
made it home that night. Disappear-
ing with him were his business pa-
pers, including the false invoices he 
wrote to pad county contracts and 
evidence of the commissions he paid 
to secure county work.
The ring of commissioners 
learned through their own private 
detectives that Schneider was being 
held by the reformers. Based on a 
bogus warrant issued for Schnei-
der’s arrest, the commissioners sent 
nine policemen to recapture him, 
but they were turned away after a 
struggle. Schneider, possibly bound 
and gagged in a second floor room, 
could hear the “ruckus” below as the 
men fought over him. He turned 
witness for the prosecution soon 
after and fled out of state, escorted 
(some might say restrained) by two 
private detectives.
The reformers may have felt jus-
tified using such tactics to secure 
evidence against the boodlers given 
their control over the jury system. 
At the time, the grand jury—the 
only body that could issue an indict-
ment formally charging a defendant 
with a serious crime—was selected 
by the county commissioners. Each 
commissioner wrote two names of 
prospective jurors on blank cards, 
which were then drawn from a hat. 
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When a new grand jury was chosen, 
one of the corrupt commissioners 
simply picked cards that had been 
dog-eared by the others in the ring. 
This system, though rudimentary, 
had been used effectively to shield 
machine politicians from prosecu-
tion for over a decade. In fact, when 
asked about the possibility of indict-
ment, Buck McCarthy commented, 
“There are only two powers over the 
[county] board, one is the Almighty, 
the other the grand jury, and we get 
to draw the grand jury.”
McCarthy’s confidence was mis-
placed, however. After reformist 
commissioner Aldrich witnessed the 
loaded draw, the reformers were able 
to convince a judge to empanel a 
special grand jury. The special grand 
jurors, “honest and true men who 
refused to be bribed or intimidated,” 
promptly indicted the ring of com-
missioners and private contractors 
on 106 counts of public corruption. 
The reformers had thus broken the 
“power of puppet master [Big Mike] 
McDonald and his commissioners 
to control the selection of grand ju-
ries that had protected them from 
criminal indictments.”
After unsuccessfully moving for 
a change of venue on the grounds 
that the prosecution had been im-
properly funded by private citizens, 
the Boodle Trial was underway. The 
evidence against McGarigle and 
Ed McDonald was overwhelming. 
“Witness after witness was placed 
on the stand to prove that [they] had 
systematically robbed the taxpay-
ers of this county for a long time.” 
Plumber Nic Schneider became the 
prosecution’s star. Notwithstanding 
accusations of perjury by the defen-
dants, Schneider’s testimony, sup-
ported by his false invoices, showed 
that Ed McDonald was connected 
with four firms that overcharged the 
county for goods and labor and that 
McGarigle collected and disbursed 
the bribes and stolen money. Both 
defendants testified in their own de-
fense but offered contradictory testi-
mony “of the flimsiest character.”
On June 18, 1887, the jury found 
both men guilty. Later that summer, 
the “other dominoes fell” during the 
omnibus trial. When the verdicts 
were read, “the ball game at White 
Stocking Park was interrupted while 
the people cheered.” The penalties 
for most defendants were substan-
tial, ranging from thousands of 
dollars in fines to three years in the 
penitentiary for McGarigle and Ed 
McDonald. However, a few received 
smaller fines after agreeing to help 
the prosecution and paying restitu-
tion. Buck McCarthy, who was fined 
just $1,000 amid allegations that he 
had influence over one of the ju-
rors, told reporters that he was “dis-
appointed and disgusted” with the 
verdict. (McCarthy went on to be 
elected to the Chicago City Council.)
Of course, McGarigle’s flight to 
Canada meant he was never fully 
brought to justice. After living in 
Banff, British Columbia, for two 
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years, where he bought into a livery 
business and invested in a hotel, he 
cut a deal and returned to Chicago. 
He eventually ran a tavern in the 
Clark Street vice district controlled 
by Big Mike McDonald. Ed McDon-
ald didn’t fare as well. While awaiting 
transfer to the penitentiary, his nine-
year-old son died after falling from a 
fire escape at the Cook County Hos-
pital while playing with friends. The 
fall was caused by loose boards that 
hospital workers had failed to secure 
or seal off. Afterward, Ed McDonald 
“lapsed into a deep depression.” He 
served his time in Joliet but was ef-
fectively finished in Chicago politics.
And what of Big Mike McDon-
ald, the boss of the boodlers and the 
architect of their schemes? He was 
never charged or tried as part of the 
Boodle Trial; the grand jury didn’t 
even vote on whether to indict him. 
Assistant State’s Attorney John Bens-
ley explained it this way: “In Mike 
McDonald’s case, an indictment 
could not be framed to hold. When 
a man lays all his plans coolly and de-
liberately with the express purpose, 
apparently, of preventing any tracing 
of crookedness to his door it is an ex-
tremely difficult thing to get him with 
legal evidence.” Big Mike explained it 
a little differently, though the senti-
ment was the same. Joking to report-
ers, he said, “[A]fter it’s all over I show 
’em a pretty clean pair of heels and I’ll 
do it this time or I’m very much mis-
taken.” He added, “Most everybody’s 
a boodler nowadays, you know.”
Big Mike McDonald remained on 
top of the Democratic Party for more 
than a decade longer, controlling an 
empire of gambling parlors, saloons, 
and prostitution houses, while di-
recting city and county patronage. 
The Boodle Trial did not slow his op-
erations. The same year of the trial, he 
was reported to have ordered city al-
dermen under his control to approve 
“The Boodlers Convicted,” New York Times head-
line, June 19, 1887. Facing: Photo of Michael “Big 
Mike” McDonald and another man, 1907, DN-
0005146, Chicago Daily News negatives collection, 
Chicago History Museum.
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a $200,000 contract for applying 
“preserving fluid” to City Hall. The 
fluid, which was 
“guaranteed to 
keep the stately 
building intact 
for a hundred 
years,” washed 
away in the rain 
two days later. 
The World’s Fair 
that took place in 
Chicago in 1893 
put more millions into Big Mike Mc-
Donald’s pockets as city contracts 
swelled and armies of tourists gam-
bled and drank at The Store. It was at 
this time that McDonald supposedly 
coined the phrase, “There’s a sucker 
born every minute.” Big Mike retired 
to his Ashland Boulevard mansion in 
the early 1900s, content to let the next 
generation of boodlers and gangsters 
try its hand in Chicago.
The legacy of the Great Boodle Trial and the reform efforts it 
epitomized is decidedly mixed. In 
some ways, it was a significant vic-
tory for early Chicago reformers. 
The Boodle Trial was a very public 
demonstration that the city’s ma-
chine politicians—at least most of 
them—were not above the law. All 
told, nine commissioners and county 
contractors who faced trial were 
convicted and sentenced to two 
years or more in jail; four others were 
convicted and fined the maximum 
allowed under statute. Up to that 
time, no politician had received such 
harsh punishment for “boodling.” 
The commission-
ers’ convictions, 
even for those 
receiving only 
fines, also meant 
they would be 
automatically re-
moved from the 
county board. 
By “turn[ing] the 
rascals out of 
the County Board and brand[ing] 
them forever as convicted public 
swindlers,” the trial ended most of 
the commissioners’ political careers, 
and more importantly, Big Mike Mc-
Donald’s control over county con-
tracts. The Tribune called the trial 
“the most successful assault on pub-
lic crooks to that date.”
More broadly, the trial and the 
scandal leading up to it galvanized 
Chicago’s reform-minded citizens, 
kick-starting the city’s reform move-
ment. To successfully investigate 
and prosecute the ring of commis-
sioners, two reformist groups—the 
Union League Club and the Citizens’ 
Association—joined forces. The alli-
ance brought activist industrialists, 
politicians, and judges together, and 
allowed for great sums of money to 
be raised to combat corruption. The 
Boodle Trial was just the first suc-
cess of the reformers. After the trial 
ended, reformers pressured the state 
legislature to review how jurors were 
selected in Cook County, leading to 
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a revamped jury system in which 
county commissioners no longer 
selected grand juries. This allowed 
prosecutors to bring public corrup-
tion cases under a fair system. With 
the help of a press corps intent on 
publishing more exposés like those 
leading up to the Boodle Trial, re-
formers went on to successfully in-
vestigate and prosecute bail-bond 
fraud and ghost payrolling. Some of 
these reform movements continue 
today.
Yet, to achieve their goals, the 
reformers became separated from 
the corrupt commissioners by only 
a matter of degree. While calling for 
the prosecution of Big Mike McDon-
ald—“the managing and directing 
thief whose influence has cast such a 
blighting shadow over public affairs in 
this county”—reformers kidnapped 
witnesses, stole documents from a 
county safe, and privately funded the 
criminal indictments of their adver-
saries. The reformers’ “ends justifies 
the means” rationalization, which 
they undoubtedly employed, rings 
as hollow as McGarigle’s defense that 
the prevailing system was at fault for 
his crimes—that he just went along 
with the boodling because everyone 
else did. While there are safeguards 
in place today to guard against the 
use of such “impure methods,” many 
contend the prosecutions of recent 
Chicago politicians have been mo-
tivated less by enacting genuine re-
form and more by furthering polit-
ical gain. One current Cook County 
Commissioner, William Beavers, 
awaiting trial for allegedly failing to 
pay taxes on money he took from 
his campaign fund (and used to 
pay gambling losses, among other 
things), has accused prosecutors of 
indicting him as retribution for re-
fusing to wear a wire against John 
Daley, a former commissioner who 
is brother to Richard Daley, Chi-
cago’s longest-running mayor.
The best measure of the Boodle 
Trial’s impact is, of course, whether 
it changed the culture of corruption 
in Chicago politics. On that score, 
the trial has had little lasting impact. 
The headlines of today’s Tribune 
read much as they did 125 years ago. 
Month after month, colorful Chicago 
politicians fight indictment (some 
from their county board seats) for 
schemes that would get an approving 
nod from Big Mike McDonald. Bea-
vers is the most recent, and possibly 
the most odd (after being indicted, 
he called the United States Attorney 
prosecuting him a “rooster with no 
nuts”), but he is by no means alone. 
On its way to earning the distinc-
tion of being the most corrupt city 
in the country, Chicago has seen five 
of its governors imprisoned, over 30 
aldermen indicted and convicted, 
and countless other public officials 
investigated. At the top of that list is 
former Governor Rod Blagojevich, 
who is currently serving a 14-year 
prison term for attempting to auc-
tion off President Barack Obama’s 
vacant United States Senate seat for 
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personal gain. Wiretaps of Blago-
jevich recorded him saying, “I’ve got 
this thing and it’s f—ing golden, and 
. . . I’m just not giving it up for f—in’ 
nothing.”
It could be argued that these 
prosecutions even taking place, 
some against officials at the highest 
levels of government, proves that the 
Boodle Trial has had a lasting im-
pact—the trial showed generations 
of reformers that political corruption 
could be combated in Chicago in a 
meaningful way. Others will more 
cynically say that for every crooked 
politician prosecuted, another will 
take his place, and that the most 
well-connected crooks—the crafty 
bosses like Big Mike McDonald—al-
ways find a way to operate above the 
law. While the truth is likely some-
where in between, the Great Boodle 
Trial reminds us most of all that as 
long as there is boodle, there will be 
men trying to take it. As McGarigle 
remarked a few months before his 
conviction, “I don’t care if the same 
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system prevailed in heaven, there 
would be boodlers. The tempta-
tion is too great. . . .  Men are but 
human[.]” ◆
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Chicago-Kent traces its ori-gin to the incorporation of the Chicago College of Law in 
1888. Chicago-Kent’s founding coin-
cided with the opening of the Rook-
ery Building, designed by the preem-
inent architectural firm of Burnham 
and Root. There is a direct connec-
tion between the now iconic Rook-
ery Building, located at Adams and 
LaSalle, and the law school building 
further west on Adams. There is also 
a more indirect but interesting con-
nection between the first and second 
schools of Chicago architecture and 
Daniel Burnham’s vision of the mod-
ern city. Architects, but especially 
Daniel Burnham, helped make and 
sustain Chicago as a world city, thus 
making it an attractive and exciting 
place to practice law to the benefit 
of all law schools in Chicago in-
cluding Chicago-Kent.
The Rookery is now a classic ex-
ample of the first school of Chicago 
architecture, which helped shape 
modern Chicago and continues to 
make Chicago a special place, de-
spite decades of desecration of this 
rich architectural heritage. The Great 
Fire of 1871 destroyed the Loop and 
the newly developed residential ar-
eas to the north. It did, however, nar-
rowly miss the lumber yard, which 
occupied the site of the current law 
school. Architects were immediately 
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Rookery Building, Historic American Buildings Survey, Library of Congress.
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attracted to Chicago because of the 
opportunities to rebuild the city. 
The skyscraper was perfected here, 
and this technological innovation, 
along with the telephone and Otis 
Elevator, created the modern office 
city by separating industrial pro-
duction from its administration. By 
1888, Chicago, along with Buenos 
Aires and São Paulo, was emerging 
as a major example of a modern city 
unconstrained by any significant ur-
ban past. The city had grown from 
about 100,000 persons when Lin-
coln was nominated for President, 
a few blocks from the current law 
school, to one million inhabitants 
and counting.
Chicago had surpassed Philadel-
phia and became America’s second 
city. Chicago’s location as a rail and 
water hub enabled it to become the 
processing center for the agricultural 
bounty of the Midwest and Great 
Plains as well as the distribution cen-
ter for this region. For a brief period 
of time, wealthy Chicagoans used 
their new wealth and power to pa-
tronize a progressive group of archi-
tects to build modern, forward-look-
ing cathedrals of commerce.
A group of Chicago architects, 
led by Dankmar Adler, Louis Sul-
livan, John Root, Daniel Burnham 
and later Frank Lloyd Wright, de-
veloped a distinctive style of archi-
tecture geared to the technological 
innovations that were changing the 
nature of business. The Rookery is 
a perfect example. The walls were 
partially load-bearing, but the inte-
rior used the state-of-the-art steel 
frame, developed by William Jenny, 
to permit it to become the tallest 
building in Chicago. The building 
is a mix of early modernist and ret-
rospective styles. The walls of large 
windows allowed maximum use of 
light because of the dimness of the 
20-watt bulbs powered by Common-
wealth Edison’s first loop generating 
station across the street. The exterior 
building is also an example of Chi-
cago Romanesque. This style, whose 
distinctive feature was the arch, was 
based on pre-Gothic Romanesque 
architecture in southern France. Ini-
tially adopted by Frank Richardson 
in Boston, the great Louis Sullivan 
brought it to Chicago. The Auditorium 
Theater, which opened in 1889, is 
the best surviving example.
After the elite lost interest in 
“modern architecture,” innovation 
languished in Chicago until the 
post–World War II modernist school 
emerged. Until the 1980s, postwar 
Chicago architecture was a monu-
ment to Mies van der Rohe. Fleeing 
Nazi Germany, he ultimately settled 
in Chicago, headed IIT’s then De-
partment of Architecture, designed 
its landmark campus, and more 
generally helped make the German 
Bauhaus the dominant form of post– 
World War II Chicago architecture.
The law school’s current building, 
which opened in 1992, is a synthesis 
of the two great schools of Chicago 
architecture. Its scale and facade re-
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call the post-fire Prairie School, es-
pecially the Rookery Building. How-
ever, the incorporation of an arch 
into early designs was rejected as dis-
proportionate to the building. Not 
only is it about the same height, it 
was designed by Holabird and Root, 
the successor firm to Burnham and 
Root. The relatively austere stone 
facade, rather than a pure steel and 
glass frame characteristic of Mies’s 
main campus buildings, echoes the 
Rookery in both style and underly-
ing philosophy. And, like the law, it 
both respects the past and looks to 
the future. Burnham rejected the ar-
gument of Louis Sullivan and Frank 
Lloyd Wright that America needed 
a distinctive style of architecture. 
Rather, “Burnham and his allies,” as 
the Encyclopedia of Chicago explains, 
“believed that the sometimes frantic 
quest for ‘American-ness’—the ob-
session with New World originality 
and horror of all things European—
was itself a kind of insecurity, and 
that maturity would consist in an 
acknowledgment that America was 
not culturally isolated from the rest 
of the world. Burnham and his as-
sociates saw the United States as 
a rightful heir to the traditions of 
Western culture.”
Daniel Burnham’s larger legacy 
for Chicago and its vibrant legal 
community is twofold. First, Prairie 
School architecture both symbolized 
Chicago’s emergence as a world city 
in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth century by allowing it to drain 
“Rookery Building, exterior,” photo from 1891, Images of America Collection, Frances Loeb Library.
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the surrounding region of both re-
sources and talent, legal and other-
wise. This legacy along with Burn-
ham’s partially realized 1909 plan 
also helped Chicago to evolve into a 
major financial center, after its origi-
nal industrial base of Chicago eroded 
after World War II. The concentra-
tion of law firms to serve Chicago’s 
economy provided employment for 
thousands of lawyers.
The second legacy of Burnham’s 
plan is much darker but also benefit-
ted Chicago lawyers. The much hailed 
plan envisioned Chicago as a great 
city in the mold of Paris or Imperial 
Vienna. But the plan primarily con-
centrated on a magnificent core and 
lakefront for the wealthy. The un-
ruly, poor, polluted, and dangerous 
rest of the city, home to the waves of 
immigrants from around the world 
and migrants from other parts of the 
country, was depicted only by end-
less low-rise, uniform blocks. In other 
words, the city that actually existed 
was largely ignored. It was left to 
others to deal with what was in fact 
happening on the streets of Chicago. 
In the twentieth century, Chicago’s 
continuing attempts to deal with 
urban problems such as racial segre-
gation, urban poverty, substandard 
housing, rampant corruption, and 
juvenile and gang violence have 
provided endless opportunities for 
lawyers and future lawyers trying to 
obtain justice for individuals caught 
in the net of poverty, corruption, 
brutality, and discrimination equally 
characteristic of Chicago, including 
a young Columbia University grad-
uate (and Chicago-Kent commence-
ment speaker), Barack Obama. ◆
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When we think of extraor-dinary nineteenth cen-tury legal institutions 
and innovations, we generally do 
not think of women. In fact, in 1875, 
the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that Illinois’ refusal to admit 
women to the bar did not violate the 
newly passed Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution. Yet 
remarkably, in 1885, women in Chi-
cago created the Protective Agency 
for Women and Children (PAWC), 
which was one of the very first orga-
nizations in the country to provide 
free legal aid to the poor.
The PAWC began inauspiciously 
and indirectly. In 1876, Caroline 
M. Brown, a wealthy woman and 
mother of two children, founded 
the Chicago Women’s Club (CWC) 
by inviting 21 women to meet in 
her living room to learn about and 
discuss the day’s pressing social, po-
litical, and cultural issues. Brown 
was acutely aware of the limited 
sphere in which elite women could 
maneuver respectably and worried 
that some might take a dim view of 
the club. Yet, in the aftermath of the 
disastrous 1871 fire, Chicago was 
a particularly hospitable place for 
such a group, as women had created 
organizations to provide charity and 
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The Legal Aid Society, established in 1905 from a merger of PAWC and the Legal Aid Bureau, photo by 
Charles J. Bernauer, 1919, ICHi-36161, Chicago History Museum.
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relief to victims of the fire. Thus a 
tradition of middle-class and elite 
women’s organizing already was be-
ginning to develop in Chicago.
One of the first projects of the 
CWC was to place a woman night 
matron in each police station, and 
the club hired and raised funds for 
the matron’s salary. The issue of hav-
ing women police matrons was one 
embraced by numerous women’s 
organizations across the country. It 
was an appropriate women’s issue be-
cause it involved the supervision of 
working-class and poor women un-
der the rationale of protecting such 
women’s virtue from male prisoners 
and from policemen (often immi-
grant men). Responsibility for the 
matron gave CWC members cause 
to visit the jails as well as to follow 
jailed women’s cases through court 
proceedings. They observed first-
hand the treatment of poor women 
and girls in Chicago courts as defen-
dants, witnesses, and victims.
These experiences underlay the 
CWC’s decision to create the Pro-
tective Agency for Women and Chil-
dren in 1885. The PAWC announced 
as its objective: “To secure justice for 
women and children, to give legal 
counsel free of charge, and to ex-
tend moral support to the wronged 
and helpless.” Significant to notice 
here is that the PAWC limited its 
clientele to women. In fact, gender 
was fundamental to how members 
of the PAWC viewed themselves, 
constructed their roles and du-
ties, and defined the problems that 
they sought to solve. According to 
the PAWC, elite and middle-class 
women had a unique responsibility 
to protect poor and working-class 
women from a host of dangers and 
injustices. Central to the PAWC’s 
ideology was the argument that 
men as a whole had failed to create a 
moral and just society. Instead, men 
had constructed a world that was rife 
with injustices to women and gov-
erned by a corrupt political system 
in which men put self-interest before 
the public good.
Charlotte Holt was hired by the 
PAWC as the organization’s superin-
tendent. She ran the office and inter-
viewed women who sought aid. She 
and her assistants, board members, 
and volunteers then would investi-
gate cases and attempt to settle them. 
A male attorney would become in-
volved only if a lawsuit was filed, 
which was a rare event. Each year, 
the number of clients to whom the 
PAWC ministered grew exponentially. 
In its first year, the PAWC handled 
156 cases, in its third year 1,145, and 
by 1905 over four thousand. There 
were few rules regarding the types 
of cases that the PAWC would take. 
Rather it functioned flexibly and 
often improvised, meeting needs as 
they arose. Thus unlike the practice 
of most later legal aid societies, the 
PAWC did not have eligibility re-
quirements, did not require that a 
client be worthy, and was entirely 
unconcerned that it might take cases 
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away from attorneys. As the PAWC’s 
superintendent stated, “We do not 
make any rules, but judge of each 
case as it comes to us.”
The two largest categories of 
cases were wage claims involving 
women whose employers had failed 
to pay them and domestic relations 
claims. In wage cases, Holt and other 
board members, using their influ-
ence and persuasion through let-
ters and personal visits, pressured 
employers to pay such wages. This 
form of conciliation was used so of-
ten that the PAWC dubbed it “White 
Mailing.” The “white” was intended 
to imply that it was done in the name 
of justice, morality, and the pub-
lic good, as opposed to blackmail, 
which was done for self-interest.
The bulk of the PAWC’s domes-
tic relations cases raised issues of 
abandonment and/or nonsupport of 
wives by husbands. These cases went 
to the heart of the PAWC’s belief in 
the absolute obligation of a husband 
to support his wife and children. In 
a typical case, a woman would ap-
pear at the PAWC’s office claiming 
that her husband disappeared weeks 
ago, leaving her penniless. Now the 
landlord was demanding rent, and 
the furniture was being repossessed. 
At times, the husband was close by 
living with relatives and at other 
times he had traveled far away. Often 
the wife would have some sense of 
where the husband was staying and 
where he worked. The PAWC would 
take the case, search for the husband, 
threaten him with a lawsuit for fail-
ure to support, and collect support 
payments for the wife. If the hus-
band did not agree to pay, the PAWC 
often would convince his employer 
to pay wages directly to the PAWC 
for the benefit of the wife. Actions 
such as these combined the threat 
of litigation with public humiliation 
by making visible a man’s failure as 
a breadwinner. In the small num-
ber of cases where these methods 
failed, the PAWC might file a lawsuit 
against the husband for nonsupport. 
Meanwhile the PAWC also would 
negotiate with the landlord and fur-
niture dealer for lower or postponed 
payments. The PAWC rarely initi-
ated lawsuits and this was for good 
reason. A lawsuit would require that 
the PAWC’s male lawyer become 
involved. Even more important, the 
PAWC had little faith in the courts 
and did not believe that courts could 
actually deliver justice.
The PAWC’s vision of legal aid went well beyond representing 
plaintiffs in claims for monetary 
damages. Rather the PAWC de-
vised for itself the mission of over-
seeing the court system’s treatment 
of poor and working-class women’s 
cases involving sexual assault. The 
PAWC declared that they intended 
to protect such women from a legal 
system that too often failed to take 
seriously cases in which women 
made claims of rape or sexual abuse. 
Rather, courts and the state dis-
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missed charges, charged defendants 
with minor offenses, or even found 
defendants innocent in cases where 
significant proof of abuse existed. 
The PAWC argued that defendants’ 
lawyers endlessly delayed cases and 
inappropriately influenced judges. If 
a trial occurred, the defendant’s law-
yer humiliated the victim by attack-
ing her character and chastity. Like-
wise the state’s attorney, who was 
at best overworked and apathetic, 
could not be relied upon to prose-
cute cases fully.
Leaders of the Agency also be-
lieved that the court system was 
filled with justices of the peace and 
police magistrates who had obtained 
their appointment through political 
connections and were often corrupt. 
By contrast with corrupt non-elite 
justices of the peace, police magis-
trates, and lawyers, PAWC members 
considered themselves more compe-
tent and certainly more virtuous. In 
1887, the PAWC confidently wrote 
a letter to state appellate judges re-
garding the deplorable state of the 
lower courts. The letter declared, 
“We have had cases in which we 
believe political influences have 
governed the Justices. We have had 
cases in which sympathy with vice 
seemingly decided the question. We 
have had cases in which the attor-
ney for the accused controlled the 
Justice, and it was deemed impos-
sible to secure a fair hearing.” They 
further complained of intentional 
delays, mind-numbing technicali-
ties, discourteous treatment by court 
personnel, crowded courtrooms, 
and magistrates’ and court officers’ 
lack of sympathy with or concern 
for poor women. The letter urged 
the appellate justices to appoint only 
the most qualified attorneys to judi-
cial positions. Regarding the issue 
of qualifications, the PAWC’s com-
plaints were laden with contradic-
tions. Even its most powerful and 
active members did not have formal 
legal training, and the PAWC’s mis-
sion was to exert their own influence 
over judges.
Part of what the PAWC found so 
objectionable was that police magis-
trates and other lower court judges 
were not only deeply ensconced in 
politics but were also non-elite, of-
ten immigrant men. The PAWC’s 
attack on court officials reflected 
their larger fear of the power that 
immigrants and non-elite men, 
through political connections and 
the system of Chicago’s ward bosses, 
had obtained. By contrast with the 
supposedly illegitimate power exer-
cised by court officials, the members 
of the PAWC saw themselves and 
the power that they exercised to be 
earned, natural, and above reproach.
When the PAWC learned about 
a case of sexual violence, it became 
involved in multiple ways, including 
conducting its own investigation, 
gathering evidence, and speaking 
with judges and attorneys. At times, 
PAWC members would pressure 
the state’s attorney into allowing 
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the PAWC’s own attorney to prose-
cute cases. In their own words, they 
would act “the sister’s part.” One of 
the PAWC’s best-publicized and 
most visible tactics was to appear 
en masse in courtroom proceedings 
involving cases of sexual assault. In 
doing so, they functioned as judicial 
watchdogs whose presence was in-
tended to shame court officials and 
lawyers into proper behavior. PAWC 
members walked a fine line in as-
suming this role, as truly respectable 
women rarely appeared in court, 
which all recognized as a masculine 
space. Chicago’s police courts were 
rough-and-tumble places—crowded, 
noisy, filled with smoke, and teem-
ing with defendants of all sorts. 
These were hardly places where la-
dies appeared. Responding to the 
PAWC’s actions, some court officials 
declared that the courts, especially 
police courts, were not an appro-
priate place for respectable women. 
Such judicial opprobrium only in-
creased the PAWC’s tenacity and 
paradoxically augmented the impact 
had by the public nature of their pro-
tests. As the PAWC explained, “The 
presence of a delegation of reputable 
women, women of social position 
and influence, changes the moral 
tone of Police court, and imparts 
courage to a timid girl, whose very 
innocence confuses her, in the pres-
ence of so many strange men.”
As PAWC members invaded the 
courtroom, they also began to ques-
tion substantive and evidentiary laws 
regarding sex crimes. Particularly 
infuriating was how defense law-
yers raised issues of a victim’s con-
sent and used past sexual conduct 
to demonstrate consent, even when 
crimes involved girls. The PAWC 
strongly condemned as hypocritical 
the double standard that permitted 
men to have sex outside marriage 
while condemning women who did 
so. Connecting this understanding 
to the legal arena, they sought to 
make a woman’s chastity and moral-
ity irrelevant to the question whether 
she was the victim of a sex crime. As 
members continued to attend court, 
they began to assert that the courts’ 
unfair treatment of women in cases 
regarding sexual violence was not 
caused only by individual men’s be-
havior. Rather, the PAWC insisted, 
this unfair treatment was engrained 
into law and required the enactment 
of new laws that would exclude evi-
dence of a women’s chastity or previ-
ous conduct. It explained, “[I]mmo-
rality should be no hindrance to 
legal rights in one sex more than the 
other.” It also campaigned to raise 
the legal age of consent, which in 
Illinois was ten for a girl. Laws rais-
ing the age of consent went hand-
in-hand with reforming evidentiary 
rules and burden of proof standards, 
as statutory rape made questions of 
consent and a girl’s character and past 
sexual conduct moot. As the PAWC 
understood, such reformed laws re-
moved a judge’s discretion and further 
controlled defense attorneys’ behavior.
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Significantly, the PAWC did not 
conceptualize its legal work as dis-
tinct from its other work, which in-
cluded providing nonlegal advice, 
giving financial aid, locating lodg-
ings, finding employment, and seek-
ing medical services for its clients. It 
would have made little sense to the 
women of the PAWC to believe that 
the purpose of legal aid was simply 
to provide their clients the ability to 
go to court separated from a concern 
with substantive justice or material 
well-being. Moreover, they claimed, 
the PAWC provided its clients with 
“self-respect” and “self-dependence.”
The women of the PAWC also 
tended to accept the stories told by 
those women seeking their help. In 
other words, they presumptively be-
lieved their clients rather than find-
ing their stories suspect. Moreover, 
they appreciated the importance of 
allowing clients to tell their stories 
slowly, which they asserted “busy 
lawyers would not bear.” As they rec-
ognized, many women who sought 
help did not have legally cognizable 
claims. But they believed that client 
narratives had value in and of them-
selves. “Many a tale of woe is told 
in our office, the mere listening to 
which by sympathetic and intelli-
gent women is all the help possible. 
It is astonishing how grateful some 
of these women are for the opportu-
nity of telling their trials to such lis-
teners.” For a poor woman to tell her 
story to a middle-class or wealthy 
woman and to have her listen to and 
acknowledge her story must have 
given the poor women a sense of 
empowerment and agency.
Like attorneys, volunteers and 
employees of the PAWC treated all 
conversations with clients as con-
fidential, often refusing to write or 
speak about individual cases. As 
Holt wrote, “Much of our work is of 
a confidential nature, and as our aim 
has always been to encourage women 
to come to us for advice and coun-
sel, it has been one of the essential 
stimulants to them to be assured of 
the strictly private nature of all work 
that could be kept private.” Thus the 
Agency never publicly discussed its 
cases in any detail, even in its fund-
Photo of Lucy Louisa Flower, longtime officer 
of the PAWC, Chicago Markers of Distinction, 
http://chicagotribute.org/Markers/Flower.htm.
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raising materials. By contrast with 
a variety of reform organizations, 
especially those related to women, 
the PAWC eschewed melodramatic 
narratives of seduction and betrayal 
of young women. In their view, such 
stories and issues were so serious 
that they needed to stand outside 
popular discourse. They were not to 
be traded upon and instead were to 
be treated as precious.
Early in its history, the PAWC’s members correctly understood 
their power as coming from their 
class and social position. As time 
passed, they began to base their 
claims to expertise and authority 
on their growing legal knowledge 
and experience. They proudly pro-
claimed that the bench and the bar 
recognized and appreciated their 
expertise. The PAWCs relationship 
to judges and attorneys was compli-
cated, because they simultaneously 
looked down on many lawyers and 
judges while still longing for their 
acceptance and basking in their 
compliments. When longtime offi-
cer and board member Mary Potter 
Crane died, the PAWC boasted that 
“she had a judicial mind, and was 
always welcome at the State’s At-
torney’s office, and her advice and 
counsel in difficult cases . . . were 
frequently sought by attorneys.” 
Likewise, one board member wrote 
that Charlotte Holt “has so won the 
respect and confidence of the courts 
that whatever case she presents 
is sure of respectful hearing.” The 
PAWC was also particularly proud 
when, in the late 1890s, they re-
ceived requests from judges to have 
the PAWC station a representative 
in every police court to handle cases 
involving women, an affirmation 
of the PAWC’s importance and its 
members’ legal and practical ex-
pertise.
The work of the PAWC had last-
ing influence not only in shaping 
the idea and practice of providing 
organized legal aid to the poor, but 
also in building Chicago’s special-
ized courts, including its juvenile 
and domestic relations courts. A 
number of women who were offi-
cers of the PAWC played significant 
roles in the creation of these courts 
and the PAWC may have functioned 
as a model for such courts. Both of 
these courts were intended to move 
away from an adversary model of 
law and sought to minimize the 
role of lawyers. Likewise, tremen-
dous discretion was vested in social 
workers, often women, whose job 
was to understand holistically those 
who appeared before the court. They 
were to use such knowledge to fash-
ion individual solutions, and such 
courts were intended to be flexible 
institutions not bound by strict un-
derstandings of the rule of law.
The PAWC was an extraordinary 
institution. At a time when only a 
miniscule number of women were 
lawyers, it created a space in which 
women provided legal advice to 
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other women. Situated within a 
thick network of women’s clubs, the 
PAWC expanded its activities to pro-
vide a wide range of legal services to 
women, and it refused to make hard 
distinctions either between the types 
of cases that it would handle or be-
tween legal versus nonlegal cases. In 
1905, the PAWC became the Chi-
cago Legal Aid Society and its vision 
of legal aid as part of a continuum of 
care became the hallmark of a Chi-
cago-style of legal aid, which is still 
with us today. ◆
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When Chicago-Kent’s pre-decessors were founded in 1888, there were no 
e-commerce, wireless access to media, 
e-mail, Facebook friends, or airline 
delays. That does not mean, however, 
that people did not shop remotely, en-
joy entertainment, communicate with 
friends, or travel. They just did them 
in other ways, all of which sometimes 
spawned disputes, some of which 
found their way into the courts. What 
follows is a story of the dreams of 125 
years ago. The characters are fictional. 
What they talk about is not.
✳          ✳          ✳
Annie Morton, 22, had just finished 
playing “Now Where Did You Get 
That Hat?” on the piano in the parlor 
of the rooming house at 2210 South 
Prairie Street in Chicago. 
“I should like to have one just the 
same as that!
“Where’er I go, they shout ‘Hello! 
Where did you get that hat?’” she 
sang.
Patrick Boland, still dressed in his 
telegraph messenger’s blue uniform 
with red trim, sat on the couch by 
the piano and applauded. His cap 
with a prominent brass number “79” 
sat on the table beside him.
WHAT’S A TELEGRAM?
Henry H. Perritt, Jr.
“Telegraph operator printing telegram,” photo by Waldon Fawcett, c. 1908, National Photo Company Collection, 
Library of Congress.
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Annie giggled and then looked at 
Luther Wardell, who was sitting in a 
plush chair beside the couch. “What’s 
the matter, Luther?” she asked. “You 
don’t like it? It’s one of the most pop-
ular songs this year.”
“Oh, I’m sorry!” Luther said. He 
plucked at his blue denim trousers. 
“I enjoyed it. I was just thinking 
while I listened.”
“About the strike?” Patrick asked.
“Yeah. I think I’m just going to go 
home and help work the farm. I 
didn’t think they’d fire all of us. Who 
knew that they’d be able to get hun-
dreds of strike breakers to work as 
switchmen and brakemen within a 
week.”
“That’s the CB&Q Railroad for you,” 
Patrick said. “They’re even nastier to 
their passengers than to the brake-
men. They’re tough.”
“Everyone is tough,” Luther re-
sponded. “I’m sick of it. You come to 
Chicago to make your fortune, and 
everyone holds you down. There are 
no decent jobs.”
“Sure there are,” Patrick said. “I’ve 
got one, with American District 
Telegraph Company. When I started, 
at age twelve, the pay was $17 per 
month. Now, I’m one of about one 
hundred boys employed, most in the 
LaSalle Street central office, but I’m 
up to $20.”
“Oh, we know, we know,” Luther 
said. “Seven long years you’ve been 
telling us your boring stories about 
it.”
“It’s not boring at all. It’s exciting,” 
Patrick said, glancing at his cap 
proudly and determined to gain the 
upper hand against Luther. “We’re al-
lowed to take on special errands for 
our customers. One guy who owns 
the livery stable up by the river paid 
me two dollars to follow his wife and 
report to him that she had spent a 
good part of her day with one of the 
stable boys.” He was disappointed by 
Annie’s lack of reaction.
“I’ve heard that Western Union pays 
better,” Annie said. “They have about 
140 boys, about half of them working 
out of the main office at LaSalle and 
Washington Streets.” Annie liked to 
tease Patrick almost as much as she 
liked playing music.
“It’s not so bad,” Patrick said. He liked 
for Annie to think well of him. “We 
wait on benches at the office and get 
called in turn, according to when we 
went out last. Almost everyone rides 
a safety bicycle now. When a cus-
tomer rings his call box, we ride out 
and pick up a handwritten message 
and bring it back for transmission.”
“What’s a safety bicycle?” Luther 
asked.
“You are a farm boy,” Patrick laughed. 
“You ought to get one. They’ve been 
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out for three years. They’re much 
better than the old kind with a large 
front wheel and a smaller rear one. 
These new ones have pneumatic 
tires.”
“I can’t afford one now,” Luther said 
glumly.
“I don’t like it that we have to pay for 
our own uniforms,” Patrick admit-
ted. “They cost $12, and they take it 
out of our pay.”
“I bet you have to buy your own bi-
cycle, too,” Luther said. “That’s not 
for me. I’ve got loans to pay back 
now.”
“You had to borrow money only be-
cause you lived so high during the 
strike. You should have saved up be-
forehand,” Annie said.
She shifted her attention back to 
Patrick. “You’re a thing of the past,” 
Annie said. “What do people need 
with telegraph boys when they can 
just use the telephone?”
“Don’t be ridiculous,” Patrick said. 
“Telephones will never replace the 
telegraph. Everyone knows that. Did 
you see the article in the January 1, 
1888, Chicago Daily Tribune?”
“No.”
“It was headlined, ‘Telephones a Nui-
sance.’ It quoted the Reedy Elevator 
Manufacturing Company as saying, 
‘The service we receive is not at all 
satisfactory, and if all instruments 
could be removed we would have 
ours fired at once. Would much pre-
fer the old system of messengers, let-
ters, or dispatches, as frequent costly 
errors are made by telephone, which 
you cannot trace to any reliable party. 
We don’t think the telephone com-
pany has sufficient assistance in their 
offices to wait on calls promptly. Fre-
quently we ring three or four times 
before we hear the lazy “hello?” and 
more frequently they reply, “Busy 
now—call again,” or “Busy; will ring 
you up when through.” But they 
never ring. We consider it very poor 
service. But as our neighbors and 
customers have the phone we must 
keep up with the procession.’”
“Frank, the Telegraph Boy,” illustration (uncredited) 
from The Telegraph Boy by Horatio Alger, Jr., 1879.
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“That’s not fair,” Annie said. “I work 
very hard. So does everyone else.”
“We’re all getting screwed,” Luther 
said. “And now, that robber baron, 
Benjamin Harrison, stole the elec-
tion from Grover Cleveland.”
“He’s not a robber baron,” Annie said. 
“I wouldn’t think you would favor 
Cleveland. He vetoed pensions for 
veterans. He’s not for the common 
man. And he’s a sympathizer for the 
South. He would have never sup-
ported the women’s suffrage move-
ment. We’re poised to get something 
done, now, on the amendment. The 
two main organizations merged last 
year.”
“Women’s suffrage—pshaw!” Luther 
said. “Next thing they’ll want is to 
shut down the saloons.”
“It would help you save money for 
a bicycle, if they were shut down,” 
Annie said. “Anyway, I’m going to 
do my part. I’m going to become a 
lawyer.”
“A lawyer!” Patrick said. “You can’t 
be a lawyer.”
“Yes, I can. Did you see the story in 
the September 7, 1888, edition of the 
Chicago Daily Tribune? Miss Emma 
Baumann and Miss Ada Dalter ap-
plied for admission to the Chicago 
Evening Law School. Several of the 
seventy young men already enrolled 
objected and went to Judge Moran, 
one of the founders, who rebuked 
them and said that the precedent 
was well established that women 
could be admitted to the bar. I’m go-
ing to apply.”
“Even if they let you in,” Patrick said, 
“and even if you get admitted to the 
bar, no one will give a girl lawyer any 
work.”
“I hope you won’t borrow any 
money for that,” Luther said, laugh-
ing. “You’d be better off borrowing it 
to go to saloons.”
“I’ve already got a promise of some 
work,” Annie said. “One of the me-
chanics at the telephone company 
wants me to help him get a patent 
for his idea for a new switchboard 
apparatus. It’s a good idea. The days 
of making a telephone call by sig-
naling a switchboard operator and 
giving her the name of the person 
to be called are over. They have just 
introduced five-digit numbers to 
accommodate the rapid growth in 
subscribers. Now automatic dialing 
is being introduced in Chicago—”
“Because of the rude and lazy opera-
tors,” Luther said.
“What does this guy look like?” 
Patrick asked.
“Jealous?” Annie teased.
“Well, you ought to think about it,” 
Patrick said. “You’re on the verge of 
becoming an old maid.”
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“And all the inventiveness is already 
producing lots of lawsuits—more 
work for lawyers,” Annie argued. 
“Alexander Graham Bell and West-
ern Union are suing each other. 
Morse’s patent for the telegraph is 
always being challenged.”
“Keep your job, but organize,” Lu-
ther said. “Launch a strike against all 
this mechanical foolishness, taking 
away jobs. It was bad enough on the 
railroad.”
“Oh, right,” Annie said. “It’s a won-
der you still have all your fingers. 
They need to make the Janney auto-
matic coupler mandatory.”
“I guess I don’t have to worry about 
that anymore,” Luther said, flexing 
the fingers on both hands and look-
ing at them. “That’s another thing a 
union could do for us. The most ba-
sic goal, though, is to insist on what 
the Congress just did for mail carri-
ers: making eight hours a full day of 
work, with overtime pay for hours 
worked over eight.”
“That’ll never happen,” Patrick de-
clared. “And they shouldn’t have 
done it for the post office workers. 
They don’t work as hard as we do, 
and we damn sure don’t have a deal 
like that.”
“They deliver mail twice a day to res-
idential customers and four times a 
day to businesses,” Luther said.
“It would be quicker if they rode bi-
cycles, like we do,” Patrick said.
“Just wait,” Annie said. “Bicycles 
aren’t the future. Self-propelled car-
riages are. The Wisconsin legislature 
just awarded a prize for a steam-pro-
pelled carriage that completed a 
race from Green Bay to Madison, a 
distance of 201 miles at an average 
speed of six miles per hour.”
“That was nine years ago,” Luther 
said. “And nothing has come of it. 
There’ll be flying machines before 
horses and railroads need to be 
afraid.”
“Better try to get a union for the 
horses,” Annie said. “There will be 
flying machines. Four years ago, a 
man named John Joseph Montgom-
ery made a glider flight near San 
Diego.”
“Yeah, but you can’t put a steam 
engine in a glider,” Patrick said. He 
laughed. “If they could, Luther, you 
can make sure they hook them to-
gether with automatic couplers. A 
flying train!”
“I’m telling you,” Annie said. “Peo-
ple are inventing things all over the 
place. Pretty soon, I won’t have to 
learn the new songs to play them on 
the piano. Thomas Edison just got a 
patent for a machine that plays mu-
sic from grooves etched on a wax 
cylinder.”
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“Well, I guess they can stop work 
on the Auditorium Theatre,” Patrick 
said, “even though it’s scheduled to 
open next year. President Harrison 
and Vice President Levi Morton 
are supposed to come to the grand 
opening. They’ll be disappointed to 
hear that all the operas and plays 
are going to have to find somewhere 
else to perform in Chicago. Oh—I 
forgot—there won’t be any operas 
and plays. They’ll be a thing of the 
past. Everyone will stay at home, 
sit on the couch and listen to ‘pho-
nographs.’ They’ll all get fat, and no 
one will learn how to play the piano 
anymore.”
Annie ignored him. “And he just 
applied for another one: an ‘Opti-
cal Phonograph,’ capable of show-
ing pictures in full motion. Already, 
people are excited about the Kodak, 
the first roll-film camera just pat-
ented. And a man named Herman 
Hollerith received a patent for an 
automatic tabulating machine. You 
punch numbers into paper cards and 
his machine sorts them.”
“You must have gotten into your 
mother’s laudanum,” Patrick said. 
“Next thing you’ll predict is send-
ing telegraph signals through the air, 
without wires.”
“It’s possible,” Annie said. “An En-
glish scientist, James Clark Maxwell, 
has already proven mathematically 
that electricity can be transferred 
through free space, and a German, 
Heinrich Hertz, has demonstrated it 
in his laboratory.”
“Things are changing pretty fast,” 
Luther said, showing a spark of en-
thusiasm for the first time. “There 
Photo of telephone operators sitting at a switchboard, 1903, DN-0001438, Chicago Daily News 
negatives collection, Chicago History Museum.
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sure is a lot of stuff being invented 
on the railroads,” Luther said. “The 
Janney automatic coupler is one; 
airbrakes before that. Now, people 
are working on automatic signaling 
systems and even on ways to replace 
the steam locomotive with some 
kind of engine that burns fuel inside 
the cylinders. I’ve been coming up 
with some ideas of my own before I 
got caught up in the strike.” A hint 
of sadness returned to his face. “One 
thing I’ll miss is all the machinery.”
He thought for a moment and then 
rushed on: “Think about what Old 
Man Sears and his partner, Roe-
buck, have already done. Their new 
‘Sears & Roebuck’ catalog was just 
published from their new office on 
Homan Street. It advertises watches 
and jewelry, which can be purchased 
by mail. ‘Book of Bargains: A Money 
Saver for Everyone,’ ‘Cheapest Sup-
ply House on Earth,’ and ‘Our trade 
reaches around the World,’ he brags. 
People are ordering them like crazy. 
There’s no reason they can’t include 
other stuff, like sewing machines, 
sporting goods, musical instru-
ments, saddles, firearms, buggies, 
bicycles, baby carriages, eyeglasses, 
clothing . . . ” He looked at Patrick. 
“Or safety bicycles,” he said.
“She must have given you some of 
the laudanum,” Patrick said. “Steam 
powered gliders linked with auto-
matic couplers, card sorting ma-
chines linked with vapor telegraph 
signals. Just imagine!” Patrick chuck-
led. “For that matter, you could order 
from the catalog with a vapor tele-
gram. Old Man Sears would track 
the orders by sorting the cards, and 
deliver the stuff by steam-powered 
gliders and steam carriages.”
“I tell you what, Luther,” Annie said. 
“Don’t go back to the farm. Stay here, 
with us. I’ll become a lawyer and 
help you get patents on all the stuff 
you’ll invent—if you keep all your 
fingers. Go talk to Reverend Frank 
Wakeley Gunsaulus, the minister at 
Plymouth Congregational Church. 
He’s already trying to persuade Phi-
lip Armour to extend his grant for 
the Sunday School that Julia Bev-
eridge is running to establish a new 
kind of school where students of all 
backgrounds can prepare for mean-
ingful roles in a changing industrial 
society, to study mechanics, chemis-
try, architecture, and library science. 
They already have something like 
that in Boston. It’s named the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology— 
‘Boston Tech,’ most people call it.”
Luther looked at her.
“We’d make a good team,” she urged, 
with a quick glance at Patrick.
“Who knows?” Luther added. 
“Maybe we’ll get married.” He leered 
at Patrick.
“Maybe,” Annie said, “Even though 
Patrick is cuter in that uniform. Put 
on the hat, handsome.”
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“Ha!” Luther said. “I can just see it. 
He’ll still be riding his safety bicycle 
around the streets of Chicago asking 
people if they want to send a telegram, 
and they’ll say, ‘What’s a telegram?’”
Annie laughed. Patrick tried to 
smile, the hat halfway to his head.
“And then,” Luther said, looking at the 
hat and laughing harder. “They’ll say, 
‘now where did you get that hat?’” ◆
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The year the Chicago-Kent College of Law was founded, a new consumer product 
arrived on the scene: the portable 
camera. Before then, taking some-
one’s photo was a big deal. A person 
would get dressed up and go to a stu-
dio. Photos were not taken without 
a person’s permission. But the porta-
ble camera changed all that—and in 
the process led to the development 
of legal rights of privacy that endure 
today.
An 1890 newspaper article 
warned:
Have you seen the Kodak fiend? 
Well, he has seen you. He caught 
your expression yesterday while 
you were innocently talking at the 
Post Office. He has taken you at a 
disadvantage and transfixed your 
uncouth position and passed it on 
to be laughed at by friend and foe 
alike. His click is heard on every 
hand. He is merciless and omni-
present and has as little conscience 
and respect for proprieties as the 
verist hoodlum. What with Kodak 
fiends and phonographs and elec-
tric search lights, modern inven-
tive genius is certainly doing its 
level best to lay us all out bare to 
the gaze of our fellow-men.
Like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, 
Lori Andrews
PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGY:
A 125-YEAR REVIEW
Advertisement for the Kodak camera, c. 1890.
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Snapchat and YouTube today, the 
portable camera fundamentally 
changed the way other people and 
institutions could peer into people’s 
lives. But the issues raised by today’s 
cutting-edge technologies are similar 
to those raised by the Kodak fiend.
In the late 1800s, a lawyer, Samuel 
Warren, married the daughter of a 
Senator. He was unprepared for the 
incessant media attention to their 
union, fueled by the newly devel-
oped portable camera. After his chil-
dren were born, paparazzi would 
snap photos of the babies when the 
family took walks down the street. 
Annoyed, he thought about what 
legal recourse he might have. Were 
there any legal precedents for a 
“right to be let alone”? He pondered 
the issue with a friend from law 
school, Louis Brandeis. They could 
have suggested that people no lon-
ger had a right to be left alone be-
cause technologies could now track 
and record what they did. Instead 
they noted that the intrusiveness of 
technologies like the portable cam-
era made it even more important 
for people to have control over in-
formation about themselves. “The 
intensity and complexity of life at-
tendant upon advancing civilization 
has rendered necessary some retreat 
from the world,” they wrote, “so that 
solitude and privacy have become 
more essential to the individual; but 
modern enterprise and invention 
have, through invasion upon his pri-
vacy, subjected him to mental pain 
and distress, far greater than could 
be inflicted by mere bodily injury.”
Their article, “The Right to Pri-
vacy,” was published in 1890 in the 
Harvard Law Review. They demon-
strated that a privacy right had a 
basis in fundamental constitutional 
values, such as the right to refuse to 
testify against oneself, and common 
law principles, such as the “right of 
determining, ordinarily, to what ex-
tent his thoughts, sentiments, and 
emotions shall be communicated to 
others.”
“The protection afforded to 
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions 
. . . is merely an instance of the en-
forcement of the most general right 
of the individual to be let alone,” 
they said. “It is like the right not to 
be assaulted or beaten, the right not 
to be imprisoned, the right not to be 
maliciously prosecuted, the right not 
to be defamed.”
Their ideas were incorporated 
into law through the creation of 
four distinct legal actions for inva-
sion of privacy: for intruding on 
someone’s seclusion, for publicly 
disclosing private information, for 
putting a person in a “false light” in 
the public eye, and for appropriating 
someone’s name or likeness for com-
mercial use. They advocated that 
information about and photos of 
people could be disseminated if they 
had consented or if the matter was of 
legitimate public interest. Since then, 
the fundamental constitutional right 
to privacy has additionally been in-
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terpreted to include a right to make 
important personal decisions, such 
as whether to use contraception or 
whether to homeschool your child.
The mode of analysis of the two 
Boston lawyers from a century ago 
has been used to analyze each new 
technology that has reached the 
courts. How does it affect the indi-
vidual and society? How do funda-
mental legal values help to protect 
the individual when the technology 
is used? As each new technology has 
been adopted—including forensic 
technologies, medical technologies, 
and computer technologies—the ap-
plication of fundamental values has 
been used to protect, and often ex-
pand, people’s privacy rights. Some-
times courts, lacking the compre-
hensive analysis of technology like 
the one undertaken by Warren and 
Brandeis, took missteps when they 
first encountered a technology. But 
ultimately, privacy prevailed.
When Charles Katz entered a 
public phone booth in 1965, he never 
imagined that cops would tap the 
phone line. The cops charged him 
with placing illegal bets—and he 
protested that they had infringed the 
Fourth Amendment limits on gov-
ernmental intrusion into a person’s 
private life. The trial judge said that 
wiretapping didn’t violate the Fourth 
Amendment because the Founding 
Fathers drafted the constitutional 
provision to honor people’s privacy 
in their homes. In this case, the po-
lice hadn’t trespassed into his home. 
In fact, there had even been a Su-
preme Court decision on the matter, 
back in 1928, when cops had used 
earlier wiretap technology to learn 
that someone was violating Prohibi-
tion.
In that earlier case, Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), 
the five-justice majority of the U.S. 
Supreme Court had held that a 
“The Kodak Fiend,” Hawaiian Gazette, December 9, 1890, 
Chronicling America Collection, Library of Congress.
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bootlegger’s privacy hadn’t been 
invaded and he hadn’t been forced 
to incriminate himself because, al-
though police had recorded the calls 
he was making from his home, the 
wiretap equipment had been placed 
on phone lines outside his home. 
Writing for the dissent was none 
other than Louis Brandeis, who was 
then a Supreme Court justice. He 
argued that fundamental values had 
to be applied to new technologies. 
He noted that when the Constitu-
tion was adopted, “force and vio-
lence”—torture and breaking into 
people’s houses—were the only ways 
that the government had to obtain 
private information about people. 
The Constitution protected against 
force and violence. But, said Bran-
deis, “discovery and invention have 
made it possible for the government, 
by means far more effective than 
stretching upon the rack, to obtain 
disclosure in court of what is whis-
pered in the closet. . . . The progress 
of science in furnishing the govern-
ment with means of espionage is 
not likely to stop with wiretapping. 
Ways may some day be developed by 
which the government, without re-
moving papers from secret drawers, 
can reproduce them in court, and by 
which it will be enabled to expose to 
a jury the most intimate occurrences 
of the home.” According to Brandeis, 
the Constitution’s fundamental value of 
privacy and the right not to incriminate 
yourself needed to be applied not only 
to “what has been, but of what may be.”
Forty years after the Olmstead decision, when Charles Katz’s 
case was appealed to the U.S. Su-
preme Court, the majority of the 
justices applied Brandeis’s logic. 
Even though Charles Katz was us-
ing a public phone booth, the Court 
said that the constitutional right of 
privacy “protects people, not places.” 
What a person seeks to preserve as 
private, even in a public place, may 
be constitutionally protected.
The Supreme Court protected 
Katz’s privacy by enunciating a legal 
test that is still used today: Did the 
person have an “expectation of pri-
vacy” and was that an expectation 
that society was willing to protect? 
As a result, police need to get a war-
rant, based on probable cause, before 
they tap someone’s phone.
The march of law enforcement 
technology continued, and in 2001, 
a new forensic technology reached 
the court. A federal agent suspected 
Danny Kyllo of growing marijuana. 
Since growing pot indoors requires 
high-intensity lamps, the agent sat in 
a car across from the home and used 
an Agema Thermovision 210 ther-
mal imager to scan Kyllo’s home. The 
scan showed that the roof over the 
garage and a side wall of the home 
were relatively hot compared to the 
rest of the home and substantially 
warmer than neighboring homes 
in the triplex. The agent concluded 
that Kyllo was growing pot and 
convinced a judge to allow him to 
search Kyllo’s home. The agent found 
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pot, and Kyllo was convicted on a 
drug charge. Because the thermal 
scanner did not physically intrude 
on the house and did not show any 
private human activities, the trial 
court said that it hadn’t infringed 
Kyllo’s constitutional rights.
The appellate court, too, held that 
Kyllo had shown no subjective ex-
pectation of privacy because he had 
made no attempt to conceal the heat 
escaping from his home, and “even 
if he had, there was no objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy 
because the imager ‘did not expose 
any intimate details of Kyllo’s life,’ 
only ‘amorphous “hot spots” on the 
roof and exterior wall.’”
When the U.S. Supreme Court 
took the case, it reversed Kyllo’s 
conviction. “It would be foolish to 
contend that the degree of privacy 
secured to citizens by the Fourth 
Amendment has been entirely un-
affected by the advance of technol-
ogy,” wrote Justice Antonin Scalia. 
“Where, as here, the Government 
uses a device that is not in general 
public use, to explore details of the 
home that would previously have 
been unknowable without physi-
cal intrusion, the surveillance is a 
‘search’ and is presumptively unrea-
sonable without a warrant.”
In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court 
in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945 (2012), assessed the use of a 
GPS tracking device installed on a 
car driven by Antoine Jones, a D.C. 
nightclub owner. Jones was the tar-
get of a narcotics investigation by 
police and the FBI. The Court held 
9 to 0 that the twenty-eight-day war-
rantless use of the GPS violated the 
Fourth Amendment. In her concur-
rence, Justice Sotomayor pointed 
out how the fundamental right to 
privacy was salient even in today’s 
world. “GPS monitoring generates 
a precise, comprehensive record of 
a person’s public movements that 
reflects a wealth of detail about her 
familial, political, professional, re-
ligious, and sexual associations,” 
wrote Sotomayor, adding, “People 
disclose the phone numbers they 
dial or text to their cellular provid-
ers; the URLs that they visit and the 
e-mail addresses with which they 
correspond to their Internet service 
providers; and the books, groceries 
and medication they purchase to 
online retailers. . . . I for one doubt 
that people would accept without 
complaint the warrantless disclosure 
to the Government of a list of ev-
ery Web site they had visited in the 
last week, or month, or year.” Justice 
Sotomayor also was concerned that 
“[a]wareness that the government 
may be watching chills associational 
and expressive freedoms.”
Contemporary medical technol-
ogies, such as genetic testing, have 
also raised disputes about the reach 
of privacy principles. When genetic 
testing became possible, people were 
tested without their knowledge or 
consent. Doctors and researchers 
would use blood that people had 
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given to labs for routine cholesterol 
or pregnancy tests and perform ad-
ditional testing, without the person’s 
consent, for everything from breast 
cancer to Alzheimer’s disease. The 
argument was, what’s the harm? The 
person had already been pricked; the 
additional tests involved no addi-
tional intervention. And even if the 
blood was collected anew—as in a 
forensic DNA test—blood tests were 
safe and noninvasive.
But then employers and insurers 
started discriminating against healthy 
people based on their genetic predis-
position to future disease. With cer-
tain genetic mutations, for exam-
ple, some women had a higher risk 
of developing breast cancer than 
other women. Even with those mu-
tations, half the women would not 
develop breast cancer. Some women 
didn’t want to know whether they 
had the mutations or not. They said 
they would feel like they had a time 
bomb ticking away inside them. But 
employers and insurers wanted that 
information to make their decisions. 
There were no legal limits on what 
could be done with that information.
During routine physicals, an 
employer in California asked the 
company doctor to surreptitiously 
test the female employees to see if 
they were pregnant and the Afri-
can-American employees to see if 
they carried the sickle cell anemia 
gene mutation. The results were not 
disclosed to the employees, but they 
were put in to their personnel files.
When the existence of the files 
leaked, the employees sued. The trial 
court dismissed the case, saying that 
the test was a modest intrusion, no 
more than what people usually un-
dergo in a physical. But the appellate 
court held that genes contain per-
sonal information that is protected 
by the fundamental right to privacy. 
“One can think of few subject areas 
more personal and more likely to 
implicate privacy interests than that 
of one’s . . . genetic make-up,” wrote 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit in Norman-Bloodsaw v. Law-
rence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 
1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998). Since 
then, Congress has passed a law, the 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimi-
nation Act, specifically prohibiting 
employers and insurers from dis-
criminating against people based on 
the results of genetic tests. People’s 
privacy rights include the right not to 
have genetic information generated 
about them or used against them.
Even computer technologies that 
collect data about people have been 
subject to a fundamental rights anal-
ysis. When Judge Robert Bork was 
nominated for the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1987, Michael Dolan, a 
Washington, D.C., newspaper re-
porter, attempted to discredit him 
by publishing his video store rental 
records. In today’s world, Judge 
Bork’s choices seem tame: British 
movies, Bond movies, costume dra-
mas. The reporter was disappointed 
not to see legal movies such as 12 
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Angry Men or To Kill a Mockingbird. 
Instead, Judge Bork had rented “only 
one truly court-related tape”: The 
Star Chamber.
Bork was denied confirmation by 
the Senate. But the publication of his 
video rentals did get the attention of 
Congress. “It is nobody’s business 
what Oliver North or Robert Bork 
or Griffin Bell or Pat Leahy watch 
on television or read or think about 
when they get home,” said Senator 
Pat Leahy. “In an era of interac-
tive television cables, the growth of 
computer checking and check-out 
counters, of security systems and 
telephones, all lodged together in 
computers, it would be relatively 
easy at some point to give a profile 
of a person and tell what they buy in 
a store, what kind of food they like, 
what sort of television programs 
they watch, who are some of the 
people they telephone. . . . I think 
that is wrong. I think that really is 
Big Brother, and I think it is some-
thing that we have to guard against.”
Senator Paul Simon agreed. 
“There is no denying that the com-
puter age has revolutionized our 
world. Over the past twenty years we 
have seen remarkable changes in the 
way each one of us goes about our 
lives. Our children learn through 
computers. We bank by machine. We 
watch movies in our living rooms. 
These technological innovations are 
exciting and as a nation we should 
be proud of the accomplishments 
we have made. Yet, as we continue 
to move ahead, we must protect time 
honored values that are so central to 
this society, particularly our right to 
privacy. The advent of the computer 
means not only that we can be more 
efficient than ever before, but that we 
have the ability to be more intrusive 
than ever before. Every day Ameri-
cans are forced to provide businesses 
and others personal information 
without having any control over 
where that information goes. . . . 
These records are a window into our 
loves, likes, and dislikes.”
The legislators applied the fun-
damental constitutional right to pri-
vacy and passed a law in 1988 for-
bidding disclosure of people’s video 
rental records (or, in this day and 
age, what they watch on Netflix). 
The bill prohibits video stores from 
disclosing “personally identifiable in-
formation”—information that links 
the customer or patron to particular 
materials or services. In the event of an 
unauthorized disclosure, an individual 
may bring a civil action for damages.
The concerns raised by the dis-closure of Bork’s video records 
are mild when compared to today’s 
digital invasion of privacy. A bil-
lion people have joined Facebook, 
a population only slightly smaller 
than either of the two largest coun-
tries, India and China. Marketing 
companies, political candidates, law 
enforcement agencies, employers, and 
other social institutions peer through 
the keyholes of people’s lives by as-
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sessing the information and photos 
that individuals post and that third 
parties post about them. Even more 
troubling, data aggregators use sur-
reptitious tracking mechanisms to 
follow people across the web and use 
that information to make judgments 
about them. If a woman does a Google 
search for old guitars and then seeks 
a credit card, she will be offered a 
credit card with less advantageous 
terms—not because her credit is 
bad, but because garage rock bands 
in general are less likely to pay off 
their credit cards. If she has a photo 
of herself with a wineglass in her 
hand, she may be denied a job. Sev-
enty-five percent of employers look 
at people’s social network presence; 
one-third reject people who have al-
cohol in a Facebook photo. And, as 
with past technologies, courts and 
legislatures have been slow to pro-
tect privacy, initially holding that 
privacy rights are lost “on affirmative 
keystroke.”
In just the past two years, how-
ever, courts and lawmakers have 
begun to protect freedom of expres-
sion and privacy on social networks. 
In Layshock v. Hermitage School Dis-
trict, 650 F.3d 205 (3d. Cir. 2011), 
and J.S. v. Blue Mountain School Dis-
trict, 650 F.3d 915 (3d. Cir. 2011), the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that public high school students had 
a First Amendment right that cov-
ered their posts on social networks 
even if those posts were critical of 
school administrators. And a few 
state legislatures—including that of 
Illinois—passed laws prohibiting 
employers from asking for the social 
network passwords of an employee 
or a job applicant. That Illinois 
law went into effect 125 years after 
Chicago-Kent College of Law opened 
its doors. The Illinois governor came 
to the campus to sign the bill into law 
and was introduced by a Chicago- 
Chicago-Kent College of Law Facebook page, retrieved Feb. 5, 2013, from https://www.facebook.com.
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Kent student who was working on 
internet privacy issues.
The Warren and Brandeis article 
not only created a legal framework 
that still applies today to safeguard 
people’s privacy, it also established 
a method for judging new technol-
ogies. The authors analyzed how 
fundamental values inherent in the 
U.S. Constitution and common law 
provide a basis to make judgments 
about new technologies. They also 
assessed how new technologies af-
fected individuals, institutions, and 
the larger society. Warren and Bran-
deis did not suggest that individuals 
adapt to each new technology, but 
instead advocated that society assure 
that each technology was employed 
in a way that was consistent with 
fundamental societal values.
When Brandeis was appointed 
to the U.S. Supreme Court 26 years 
after his privacy article appeared, 
he continued to champion the ap-
plication of constitutional values to 
modern technologies. He also wrote 
about the nature of a Constitution. 
“Time works changes, brings into 
existence new conditions and pur-
poses. Therefore a principle, to be 
vital, must be capable of wider appli-
cation than the mischief which gave 
it birth. This is peculiarly true of 
Constitutions. They are not ephem-
eral enactments, designed to meet 
passing occasions. They are, to use 
the words of Chief Justice Marshall, 
‘designed to approach immortality 
as nearly as human institutions can 
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approach it.’ The future is their care, 
and provision for events of good and 
bad tendencies of which no proph-
ecy can be made. In the application 
of a Constitution, therefore, our con-
templation cannot be only of what 
has been but of what may be.”
When the law school opened its 
doors 125 years ago, it would have 
been difficult to imagine the high-
tech world of today. But by learning 
about cutting-edge technologies as 
well as fundamental legal principles, 
the students at IIT Chicago-Kent 
College of Law have been well edu-
cated, in every era, to face their gen-
eration’s legal challenges. ◆
•
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As 1888 drew to a close, John Montgomery Ward stood atop the world of profes-
sional baseball. The star shortstop 
had just led the New York Giants 
to the National League pennant, fol-
lowed by a triumph over the St. Louis 
Browns of the rival American Asso-
ciation in what even then went by 
the inflated title of baseball’s “World 
Series.” A dominating pitcher early 
in his career (he threw the second 
perfect game in major league his-
tory), an arm injury forced Ward 
to recreate himself as an infielder, 
where he became one of the best 
fielders and hitters of his era. He was 
lauded in the press as a ballplayer 
with “few equals and no superiors,” 
and “by long odds the most popu-
lar player in the profession.” These 
accomplishments would eventually 
earn Ward a place in the Baseball 
Hall of Fame.
Ward’s skills on the ball field were 
only a part of what made him such a 
remarkable figure. Contemporaries 
and historians alike have struggled to 
describe him. One adjective-happy 
biographer took the saturation ap-
proach: he was a “jug-eared, willowy, 
peach-fuzzed, overreaching punk” 
as well as “honorable, smart, and te-
nacious.” More admired than liked 
seems to have been the consensus 
view of Ward contemporaries. In a 
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JOHN MONTGOMERY WARD:
THE LAWYER WHO TOOK ON BASEBALL
Photo of John Montgomery Ward, 1922, Bain Collection, Library of Congress.
Christopher W. Schmidt 45
profession not known for intellectu-
alism, he stood out. Although Ward 
left school at the age of thirteen in 
order to pursue his baseball career, 
he eventually earned, in his spare 
time, degrees in political science and 
law from Columbia. He was said to 
speak five languages. A regular con-
tributor to newspapers and periodi-
cals, in 1888 he published Baseball: 
How to Become a Player, which he 
described as a “handbook of the 
game, a picture of the play as seen by 
a player.”
Ward was also a pioneering labor 
leader. In 1885, he established Amer-
ica’s first sports union, the Broth-
erhood of Professional Base Ball 
Players. Initially designed to help 
sick, injured, or hard-up ballplayers 
and promote professional standards, 
the Brotherhood quickly evolved 
into something approaching a craft 
union for ballplayers. Ward had for-
ward-looking attitudes on race as 
well. At a time when the color line 
was hardening in American society, 
and organized baseball had become 
a whites-only affair, Ward urged the 
Giants to sign an African-American 
pitcher.
If all this wasn’t enough, Ward’s 
social life was also noteworthy. In 
1887 he married a New York actress 
and socialite, Helen Dauvray, who 
also happened to be a passionate 
baseball fan. “Her tiny hands beat 
each other rapturously at every vic-
tory of the Giants and her dark eyes 
were bedewed at every defeat,” re-
ported the New York Times. “But 
the thousands of spectators who ob-
served Miss Dauvray’s emotions lit-
tle suspected that one of the Giants 
had any precedence over the others 
so far as her affections were con-
cerned.” She had donated the Tiffany 
trophy that went to the World Series 
champion; it was the “Dauvray Cup” 
that her husband brought home at 
the end of the 1888 season. In How 
to Become a Player, the ever gallant 
Ward included a chapter explaining 
the basics of the game “for the ben-
efit of those ladies whose escorts ei-
ther cannot, or will not, answer their 
questions.” He also offered advice for 
his gentleman readers: “Whoever 
has not experienced the pleasure of 
taking a young lady to her first game 
of ball should seize the first opportu-
nity to do so.”
Life was not all three-hit games and 
celebrity life for the great Monte Ward, 
however. His relationship with 
Helen Dauvray was strained almost 
from the start. He was carrying on 
an affair, and she knew it; she wanted 
to return to the stage, and he didn’t 
want her to. They lived together for 
only a year and soon divorced.
His baseball career too was about 
to veer off in some unexpected direc-
tions. Following his World Series tri-
umph, Ward captained a team of Na-
tional League all-stars that traveled 
around the globe between October 
1888 and April 1889 in an effort to 
promote the game overseas. It was a 
grand gesture, fitting for an emerg-
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ing era of American nationalism 
and confidence on the international 
scene. But the world tour also helped 
set in motion one of the most signifi-
cant upheavals in baseball’s history. 
The man who organized and led the 
tour around the globe was Albert 
Goodwill Spalding. Soon after they 
returned home, he and Ward would 
face off in an epic struggle for the fu-
ture of the game.
Spalding, a star pitcher in his 
younger years, now owned the Chi-
cago White Stockings of the Na-
tional League in addition to a bur-
geoning sporting goods empire. The 
game never had a more effective and 
more passionate salesman. Baseball, 
he once wrote, captured the nation 
because “it is the exponent of Amer-
ican Courage, Confidence, Combat-
iveness; American Dash, Discipline, 
Determination; American Energy, 
Eagerness, Enthusiasm; American 
Pluck, Persistency, Performance; 
American Spirit, Sagacity, Success; 
American Vim, Vigor, Virility.” 
(Spalding also basically created base-
ball’s all-American birth myth, which 
conveniently featured a future Civil 
War hero, Abner Doubleday, in 1839 
dreaming up the game in bucolic 
Cooperstown, New York. In fact, 
baseball had largely evolved from 
various children’s games; if it ever 
had a proper birth moment, it was 
among young professionals in 1840s 
New York City.) Spalding envisioned 
the world tour as an opportunity to 
sell two things he loved above all: 
the game of baseball and the equip-
ment that bore his name. Despite his 
background as a player, and despite 
his overwrought romanticism about 
the national pastime, Spalding ap-
proached his role as a team owner 
from the perspective of the captain 
of industry that he had become: the 
players were employees, and com-
fortably paid ones at that; and it was 
the owner’s job to control costs and 
ensure a compliant workforce. Need-
less to say, he didn’t think much of 
Ward’s efforts with the Brotherhood.
John M. Ward, New York Giants baseball card por-
trait, 1887, Library of Congress. Facing: Photo of 
Albert Goodwill Spalding, 1910, Bain Collection, 
Library of Congress.
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The world tour had just reached Cairo, Egypt, in February 1889 
when the players received news that, 
at their winter meetings in New 
York, the National League owners 
had adopted a major reform de-
signed to reign in player salaries. 
They created a player classification 
system under which “Class A” play-
ers earned $2,500, “Class B” players 
$2,250, and so on, down to “Class E” 
players who earned $1,500. The clas-
sifications scheme took into account 
not only player ability, but also “con-
duct, both on and off the field.”
Ward, who had already estab-
lished himself as his generation’s 
most outspoken critic of baseball’s 
distinctive labor practices, saw the 
plan as an affront to the players. 
What made working as a profes-
sional ballplayer different from any 
other occupation was the “reserve 
clause,” a provision in player con-
tracts under which an owner could 
“reserve” a number of players when 
the term of their contracts ended. 
The clause prohibited the player 
from negotiating with another team 
unless his team released him. As 
professional baseball was controlled 
by an agreement between the teams 
under which each team agreed to 
respect the player contracts of other 
teams, the reserved player faced 
three options: sign a new contract 
at the terms dictated by the owner; 
hold out and hope for better terms; 
or stop playing baseball. Owners 
defended the reserve clause as es-
sential to ensuring the stability of 
the game. It did indeed further this 
goal. But there was another reason, 
one they didn’t trumpet so proudly: 
it kept down player salaries. And 
here too it was effective. In the late 
1880s, as club profits tripled, player 
salaries grew by only 30 percent, a 
fact at least partly attributable to the 
reserve system.
In 1887, Ward had a scathing at-
tack on the reserve clause, titled “Is 
the Base-Ball Player a Chattel?” He 
compared the reserve clause to “a 
fugitive-slave law”: it “denies [the 
player] a harbor or a livelihood, 
and carries him back, bound and 
shackled, to the club from which he 
attempted to escape.” The remedy, 
according to Ward, was simple: get 
rid of “base-ball law” and allow “the 
business of base-ball to be made to 
rest on the ordinary business basis.”
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When he learned of the owners’ 
classification plan, Ward was so in-
censed he threatened to abandon the 
world tour to come home and con-
front the owners. (The news that the 
Giants were trying to trade him only 
added to his frustration.) He sus-
pected that Spalding had planned the 
entire trip just to get him and some 
of his allies out of the country in or-
der to go forward with their plans. 
If this was indeed Spalding’s plan 
(and there is no evidence it was), it 
backfired, as the tour ended up giv-
ing some of the game’s top players 
long hours to share their grievances. 
The plan for the baseball revolution 
that would upend the game in 1890 
might very well have been hatched 
in quiet conversation among the 
players while on Spalding’s world 
tour. Nearly all the players on the 
tour would join Ward’s revolt against 
the National League.
During the 1889 season, Ward 
began preparations for the creation 
of a rival major league, the Players 
League. Working in secret (he was, 
after all, still on the enemy’s pay-
roll), he found financial backing and 
convinced many of his fellow play-
ers to commit to the new league. 
Some aspects of the Players League 
looked familiar. The players were fa-
miliar—the new league lured many 
of the best National League players 
to its rosters. And the cities in which 
they played were familiar—the seven 
cities in which their eight teams 
played were all cities that already 
had National League teams. But the 
business model behind the Players 
League was radically different from 
anything that had come before. 
Each club was run by an eight-man 
board, consisting of four players and 
four investors. The league was gov-
erned by a senate-like organization, 
with two representatives from each 
team (one elected by players, one by 
owners). Players had three-year con-
tracts, and no reserve clause. Inves-
tors were promised the first $10,000 
of each club’s net profit, with the rest 
to be divided among the players.
Spalding and the National League 
attacked the Players League. First, 
they turned to the courts: the Giants 
sued Ward for breach of contract. 
Ward had violated the terms of his 
reserve clause, they claimed, and 
they asked a New York state court 
to issue an injunction prohibiting 
Ward from playing for anyone else. 
The court denied the injunction. As 
the reserve clause failed to specify 
such essentials as Ward’s salary and 
the terms of the renewed contract, 
the judge concluded that it was too 
indefinite to be treated as a bind-
ing contract for the 1890 season. 
The court also raised the disturbing 
question of whether, assuming the 
reserve clause were read to consti-
tute a binding contract for the fol-
lowing season, the renewed contract 
would also include a reserve clause. 
If so, the player would be tied to his 
current team for as long as the team 
desired, while the team could release 
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a player with only 10 days’ notice.
This was rather absurd, according 
to the judge. “We have the spectacle 
presented of a contract which binds 
one party for a series of years and 
the other party for 10 days, and of 
the party who is itself bound for ten 
days coming into a court of equity to 
enforce its claims against the party 
bound for years.” The judge con-
cluded that the reserve clause was 
unenforceable for “want of fairness 
and of mutuality.”
With the courts refusing to help, 
Spalding turned to public opinion. 
He pulled out all the rhetorical stops. 
What the players were doing was 
“secession,” a “revolt,” a “war”; the 
National League was confronting 
“hot headed anarchists” who were 
leading a “revolutionary movement.”
But the fall of the Players League 
after just one season came not from 
Spalding’s attacks in the press, nor 
from legal challenges. It came from 
the marketplace. The new league 
had the best players, but this was not 
enough. With three major leagues 
competing for a limited fan base, 
everyone suffered at the gate. At 
season’s end, when Spalding opened 
negotiations with Players League in-
vestors, he pointedly excluded Ward 
and any other players. “[T]he mon-
ied men met with the monied men,” 
as Spalding put it. The National League 
owners simply bought out their 
competition; several Players League 
clubs were integrated into a recon-
figured National League. Ward’s rev-
olution was over.
Ward returned to the National 
League, where he played four more 
seasons. He was still one of the best 
players in the league when he retired 
in 1894. He went on to be a success-
ful lawyer, a gentleman farmer, and 
a top amateur golfer. Although he 
mended fences with organized base-
ball, his passion for the cause he had 
led never left him. In 1925, shortly 
before his death, he gave a speech—
at an event to celebrate the National 
League, of all places—recounting 
the events of 1888–1890 in which he 
made clear that the war against the 
National League, while doomed, was 
justified.
For a brief moment, the Players League presented a radical al-
ternative business model for profes-
sional sports, one in which the play-
ers and owners shared control of the 
game as well as its profits. With the 
failure of Ward’s baseball revolution, 
the owner-dominated system lived 
on. In the following decades, various 
teams would go to court to have the 
reserve clause enforced against play-
ers who had jumped their contracts 
(a relatively common occurrence 
any time there was a rival league that 
refused to abide by the agreement 
that controlled the baseball monop-
oly). Judges, with only the rarest of 
exceptions, sided with the players, 
often citing Ward’s case as author-
ity on the matter. The reserve clause 
lived on, however, and it did so be-
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cause the baseball monopoly, while 
periodically challenged, remained in 
place. As long as owners respected 
the contracts of their on-the-field 
competitors, they did not need the 
courts. For this reason, the most 
significant legal challenges to base-
ball’s unique labor practices came in 
the realm of antitrust, not contract 
law. But baseball law survived this 
challenge too, as the United States 
Supreme Court granted, and then 
twice reaffirmed, that federal anti-
trust law did not apply to profes-
sional baseball.
When change eventually came in 
the 1970s, it was at the hands of an-
other organized players movement, 
but this time it was achieved not 
through a rival league but through 
labor negotiations (with a critical as-
sist from a sympathetic arbiter). To-
day, major league baseball operates 
in a way that has some similarities 
to the core premise of the alternative 
model Ward had offered. The game 
is governed, in large part, through 
collective bargaining agreements be-
tween players and owners. With the 
skyrocketing of player salaries after 
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the fall of the reserve clause, the game’s 
profits are far more evenly distrib-
uted between players and owners. 
It took almost a century, but John 
Montgomery Ward’s vision for ma-
jor league baseball has, in some part, 
been realized. ◆
•
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When the United States Congress enacted the first “antitrust” law in 
1890, it was taking a shot in the dark. 
At the time, there was no concept of 
“antitrust law”—i.e., a general le-
gal regime intended to combat re-
straints on competition. Today more 
than 100 countries have such laws, 
including all significant participants 
in the global economy. Competition 
law has become a major factor in eco-
nomic life throughout much of the 
world. U.S. antitrust law has played 
a central role in this remarkable evo-
lution, and it is generally acknowl-
edged to be the most important of 
these laws. It is the touchstone and 
frame of reference for international 
discussions, and it is often used as 
a model or at least a major source 
of guidance by other countries in 
developing their own competition 
laws. The story is extraordinary, in-
terwoven with the roles of power 
and ideas and intertwined with the 
evolution of the U.S. and its role in 
the world. This brief essay sketches 
its trajectory. Chicago-Kent’s role as 
an educational institution tracks that 
trajectory.
David J. Gerber
U.S. ANTITRUST: FROM SHOT IN THE 
DARK TO GLOBAL LEADERSHIP
“The fog,” Puck cartoon by Will Crawford, 1911, Library of Congress.
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I. A Shot in the Dark
This new type of legislation was a “shot in the dark” in the sense 
that few, if any, of the legislators had 
any way of knowing what conse-
quences the legislation would have. 
They were “shooting” at something, 
but they didn’t know what they 
might actually hit. So what were they 
trying to do and why?
Antitrust law was, above all, a 
response to social turbulence and 
tensions. The United States in the 
1880s presented a complex mixture 
of hope, fear and resentments. The 
terrible Civil War was a memory, 
but not a distant one. Rapid indus-
trialization was creating great wealth 
for a few and jobs for many. Immi-
gration was bringing millions from 
Europe to take those jobs and to find 
land to farm in the Midwest and the 
West. Yet the rapid changes also gen-
erated sectional conflicts and social 
tensions, and political and legal in-
stitutions strained to respond effec-
tively to them.
This mixture of pressures, con-
flicts and resentments led Congress 
to enact what came to be known as 
antitrust law. One key background 
factor was the resentment that many 
felt towards the new super rich and 
their lavish and ostentatious life-
styles. Located primarily in New 
York and other cities on the East 
Coast, these groups had achieved 
great wealth quickly, often through 
control of large manufacturing busi-
nesses. These firms often dominated 
specific industries, and this domi-
nance allowed them to exclude new 
entrants from those industries. It 
also allowed them to extract what 
many viewed as unfair prices and 
conditions on their suppliers as well 
as their employees. This led to an-
ger at the power of these so-called 
“trusts” and often combined with 
anger at the power of their owners 
to control the destinies and stifle 
the possibilities of others, especially 
those in other parts of the country. 
A specific catalyst for antitrust law 
was rising anger among Midwestern 
farming communities at what they 
saw as rapacious and monopolis-
tic conduct by railroad companies 
and others who they believed were 
manipulating prices paid to farm-
ers for their grain and livestock. 
Groups representing these interests 
pressured their representatives in 
Congress to do something about the 
“trusts” that were amassing fortunes 
for a few, but exploiting vast num-
bers of hardworking farmers and 
tradesmen.
Congress responded to this 
pressure by enacting the Sherman 
Antitrust Act in 1890. The name 
that soon attached to the legisla-
tion—“anti-trust”—reflected its goals. 
It was a tool to be used to combat the 
monopolistic abuses of very large 
enterprises. There was, however, no 
model for Congress to use in doing 
what it wanted to do—or wanted 
to appear to be doing. So Congress 
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“punted”—it simply federalized two 
barely used legal principles. It took 
two concepts from the common law 
that had been used for quite different 
purposes, first in England and then 
to a limited extent in the U.S., and it 
made them enforceable under fed-
eral law. The statute was very short, 
and its basics have not changed since 
1890. The first concept was “restraint 
of trade.” This concept had been 
used primarily in civil cases to com-
bat overly restrictive provisions in 
contracts. The second basic idea was 
“monopolization.” It had also been 
part of the English common law, but 
for centuries it had been little used 
in either England or the U.S. The leg-
islation contained virtually no guid-
ance as to the substantive content of 
the provisions, leaving issues of con-
tent to the federal courts.
The Sherman Act transformed 
the role of these private law concepts 
by providing that the federal govern-
ment could enforce them. Congress 
appears to have given little thought 
to how this was to take place. It did 
not create specific procedure for the 
enforcement of the antitrust provi-
sions. It merely authorized the U.S. 
Justice Department to file claims in 
the regular courts, using the normal 
rules for civil proceedings. Given that 
the federal government was still very 
small in 1890, the legislators could 
hardly have envisioned extensive 
federal administrative application of 
the provisions. Some assumed that 
private actions could be brought on 
the basis of the legislation, and this 
was confirmed a few years later.
This was the “shot in the dark”! 
The U.S. Congress was responding 
to specific domestic pressures. The 
legislators just took common law 
concepts and gave the federal gov-
ernment authority to use them in 
the federal courts. The legislators 
paid little, if any, attention to how 
others in the world had dealt with 
similar issues or what, if anything, 
they might think about the U.S. ex-
periment. They just experimented, 
basically relying on judges to sort 
out the issues and develop the law.
II. An Antitrust System Develops
Prior to the Second World War, the system evolved slowly and 
fitfully according to a pragmatic, 
court-based process—typical of U.S. 
legal development generally. The 
judges were solving the conflicts be-
fore them, and there is little evidence 
that they thought about their deci-
sions as creating a “system” of an-
titrust law. They relied on accumu-
lated practical experience, domestic 
conceptions of the judicial role, and 
often on ideologies about the role 
of markets as they shaped the con-
tent and roles of antitrust in the U.S. 
There were relatively few cases, and 
other than in a few large companies 
there was relatively little interest in 
this area of the law.
After the war, the roles and im-
portance of antitrust law expanded 
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greatly. One factor was transna-
tional. Antitrust came to be seen in 
the U.S. as a part of a global “mis-
sion” to provide an antidote to fas-
cism and to support freedom. Many 
believed that the concentrations of 
economic power in Germany and 
Japan were at least in part respon-
sible for the horrors of the Second 
World War, and they saw antitrust 
as a means of preventing such con-
centrations or at least curbing the 
resulting abuses. This led U.S. gov-
ernment officials and others actively 
to promote antitrust in Europe. A 
European version of antitrust law 
had begun to develop in the 1920s, 
but it had not gained much status in 
most European countries, and thus 
U.S. antitrust became a symbol of re-
structuring in Europe, both in indi-
vidual countries and in connection 
with the process of European inte-
gration. At the same time, the eco-
nomic and political dominance of 
the U.S. in the so-called “free world” 
allowed the U.S. to apply its antitrust 
law to conduct outside its own ter-
ritory and thus further support the 
antitrust mission.
This heightened political, sym-
bolic and economic importance of 
antitrust on the international plane 
combined with the de facto protec-
tion of the U.S. market encouraged 
rapid growth in the perceived impor-
tance of antitrust within the U.S. and 
the expansion of antitrust principles. 
By the early 1970s, antitrust had be-
come a very important part of the le-
gal environment of business, and as 
such it attracted strong interest from 
lawyers. The growing importance of 
antitrust meant that law schools in-
creased their offerings in the area. 
According to Ralph Brill, antitrust 
was first taught at Chicago-Kent Col-
lege of Law in 1973. This also meant, 
however, that antitrust represented a 
major cost for many U.S. businesses. 
These costs were tolerated as long as 
economic factors (especially currency 
and regulatory obstacles) buffered U.S. 
firms from international competition.
In the 1970s, the international 
economic picture changed markedly, 
and these changes in global economic 
conditions generated a fundamental 
change in U.S. antitrust law. The “oil 
shocks” of the early 1970s and the 
concomitant international currency 
restructuring led to increased aware-
ness in the U.S. business community 
of the need for U.S. businesses to 
compete internationally. Antitrust 
now began to appear as a burden on 
the U.S. economy, and this led schol-
ars to examine ever more carefully 
the intellectual justification for such 
burdens. Economists and law pro-
fessors increasingly argued that the 
courts had expanded antitrust law 
too far and that the entire edifice of 
antitrust law should be viewed from 
the perspective of its economic im-
pact. This perspective quickly won 
favor in the courts and law faculties, 
and within a few years it led to a rad-
ical revision of standards for antitrust 
law in the U.S. The central substantive 
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law questions were now to be judged 
by economists according to economic 
criteria.
III. Global Competition Law Lead-
ership
The “shot in the dark” that was the U.S. antitrust law system is 
today no longer solely a domestic 
field of law. It is now also a criti-
cally important component of global 
economic policy! The system that 
U.S. judges had evolved to deal with 
purely domestic problems and that 
relied on little more than confidence 
in the capacity of courts to develop 
reasonable responses to conflicts 
has been transformed into the cen-
tral player in efforts to respond ef-
fectively to economic and other 
forms of globalization. It is now a 
U.S. export product, and the stakes 
are enormous. What directions 
and forms will the rules of com-
petition take? Treatment of these 
issues will be a factor in the future 
of many countries, including the 
U.S., and for more than two decades 
Chicago-Kent has brought transna-
tional competition law to our stu-
dents, and Chicago-Kent faculty 
have contributed to the international 
discussion of these issues.
 
A. Foreign Interactions and Percep-
tions
 
U.S. antitrust now plays on a 
global stage, and much will depend 
on how foreign experts, lawyers, 
government officials and business 
leaders see U.S. antitrust. They will 
make decisions about what to do in 
their own countries and on the inter-
national level. This means that their 
perspectives on the U.S. system are 
critical to its roles both at home and 
abroad, and foreign images of U.S. 
antitrust have changed radically. Prior 
to the Second World War, those in 
Europe who knew anything about 
U.S. antitrust law (and they were 
few) generally considered it a mis-
take. They tended to see it as a fail-
ure that actually created more harm 
than good by forcing companies to 
merge rather than cooperate. This 
view predominated in large measure 
until after the Second World War. 
The Europeans were developing a 
different concept of competition law 
that emphasized administrative con-
trol of dominant firms. This concep-
tion of competition was spreading 
rapidly in Europe in the 1920s, but 
depression and war led to its virtual 
abandonment.
After that war ended, however, 
U.S. antitrust law became associated 
with U.S. economic dominance in 
the “free world.” The real and imag-
ined connections between economic 
concentration and military expan-
sion in both Germany and Japan 
convinced many that U.S.-style anti-
trust law should be used to combat 
such concentrations. U.S. occupa-
tion forces in Germany and Japan 
imposed U.S. antitrust ideas during 
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the occupation period, and the U.S. 
insisted that both countries either 
enact or maintain competition law 
after the occupation. This increased 
awareness of these ideas abroad. 
Perhaps more important, however, 
was the perception that antitrust 
was a source of strength for the U.S. 
economy and thus a potential spur 
to growth that other countries could 
employ.
U.S.-style antitrust did not, how-
ever, always fit well with European 
legal traditions and institutions, and 
in most European countries skepti-
cism toward the U.S. model limited 
progress in protecting competition. 
In Germany, however, a separate set 
of ideas about how to protect com-
petition developed in the 1930s and 
1940s in the underground, and af-
ter the war it became the basis for 
German antitrust law. From here 
it spread to the European level and 
became part of the process of Euro-
pean integration. The basic idea of 
U.S. antitrust law—i.e., protecting 
the competitive process from re-
straints—was part of this model of 
competition law, but the model itself 
was conceptually and institutionally 
quite distinct. European scholars and 
officials in these areas often looked 
to U.S. antitrust for comparisons and 
insights into problems, but there was 
relatively little interaction between 
U.S. and European forms of compe-
tition law until the 1990s.
In the 1990s, these relationships 
became far closer and more impor-
tant for both the U.S. and Europe-
ans. Moreover, the fall of the Soviet 
Union precipitated widespread in-
terest in market-based approaches 
around the world and revived the 
messianic tenor of the U.S. antitrust 
law community. Many countries 
that had socialist or other com-
mand-based approaches to the or-
ganization of economic activity now 
introduced antitrust laws or signifi-
cantly increased their investment in 
Title page of Control of the Market, by Bruce Wyman, 1911, Library of Congress.
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the enforcement of such laws. Often 
they looked to U.S. antitrust officials, 
lawyers and scholars for help in im-
plementing or evaluating their new 
activities.
B. Policy Issues and Obstacles
 
This has raised a critically im-
portant issue: How will/should 
competition law on global markets 
be implemented? Globalization has 
shown the limitations and distor-
tions of the traditional jurisdictional 
system—e.g., differing rules and 
procedures for different parts of the 
same economic market. Many in 
the U.S. and elsewhere believe that 
the best response to these problems 
is to encourage all countries to fol-
low at least the basic substantive law 
approach of the U.S. antitrust law 
system. This would generate conver-
gence among competition law sys-
tems around the world and reduce 
the harms caused by current jurisdic-
tional arrangements. Many others are, 
however, skeptical that the U.S. model 
should be the focus of convergence. 
They often see some form of coordina-
tion (perhaps at the World Trade Or-
ganization level) as the best response.
How these foreign decision mak-
ers and decision shapers understand 
and evaluate U.S. antitrust law is 
critical to this set of decisions. It is 
important, therefore, that they un-
derstand as clearly as possible how 
U.S. antitrust law works and what 
the guiding ideas are behind the law. 
Only then will they be in a position 
adequately to evaluate it, compare it 
with their own systems, and make 
informed choices in relation to it. 
There are many obstacles—linguis-
tic, comparative, political and eco-
nomic—to achieving an adequate 
understanding of the U.S. system 
and of the implications of various 
policy choices for the global system 
and for individual components of it. 
Moreover, it is critical that U.S. law-
yers, officials and scholars acquire a 
better understanding of the compe-
tition law elsewhere and thus of the 
potential bases for convergence and 
coordination on the global level.
IV. Concluding Comments
A former U.S. antitrust official not long ago wrote that U.S. anti-
trust is (or could be) the “light of the 
world.” That might be a bit strong, 
but U.S. antitrust certainly does play 
a key role in the development of the 
global economy and its many com-
ponents. Now the big question is 
whether U.S. legal thinking and the 
creative and pragmatic impulses that 
have been so much a part of U.S. an-
titrust law will continue to provide 
the leadership that can make the 
most of these opportunities.
These changes have important 
implications for U.S. legal education. 
At Chicago-Kent College of Law, 
we are doing our part. Here, and 
at some other leading law schools, 
these issues have generated increas-
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ing attention. Since the 1980s, and 
even more so since the early 1990s, I and 
others have included transnational issues 
in the domestic antitrust course and 
included an antitrust focus in courses 
such as international business trans-
actions. I have also long offered a 
seminar in international and com-
parative antitrust law that tackles 
these issues directly. These efforts 
have two central objectives. One is 
to educate U.S. lawyers to perform 
more effectively in this new global 
context. The other is to educate for-
eign lawyers about U.S. antitrust law 
and provide them with tools for un-
derstanding and evaluating it and its 
global roles.
One fact stands out in 2013 at the 
celebration of Chicago-Kent’s 125 
years of teaching law. The U.S. will 
have to earn its leading role in anti-
trust law on the global level. Effec-
tive legal education in this area will 
be a key element in whether it will be 
successful in achieving that goal. ◆
David J. Gerber teaches antitrust law, 
comparative law and more specialized 
seminars such as international and com-
parative competition law. He has been a 
member of the Chicago-Kent faculty since 
1982. After graduating from the Uni-
versity of Chicago Law School, Professor 
Gerber practiced law in New York City 
and then spent several years working in 
a German law firm and in several uni-
versities in Europe. He frequently lectures 
and teaches in various universities and 
other institutions in Europe, Asia and 
elsewhere. His most recent book is Global 
Competition: Law, Markets and Globaliza-
tion (Oxford Univ. Press, 2010, pbk. 2012).
Sources and Further Reading
■ David J. Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Mar-
kets and Globalization (2010).
■ David J. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twenti-
eth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (1998).
■ Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American 
Law, 1836–1937 (1991).
■ William Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in 
America: The Evolution of the Sherman Act (1965).
■ Rudolph J. R. Peritz, Competition Policy in America, 
1888–1992: History, Rhetoric, Law (1996).
Then & Now: Stories of Law and Progress60
For generations, commentators have decried the fact that we live in an era of an imperial 
presidency. The second President 
Bush famously (or infamously) ignored 
Congress in subjecting suspected ter-
rorists around the world to military 
commissions at Guantánamo Bay and 
citizens and suspected terrorists 
alike to warrantless surveillance of 
their phone calls. President Barack 
Obama, like his predecessor, has 
used executive power to shape rules 
and regulations that Congress had 
delegated to subordinates in agen-
cies as opposed to the President 
directly. Both Presidents claimed 
broad power to circumvent the Sen-
ate’s power to consent to treaties and 
appointments. Congress and the 
courts have fought back to limit the 
scope of presidential power, at least 
in discrete contexts.
Somewhat lost in history, a com-
parable battle over executive power 
brewed one hundred and twenty-five 
years ago, culminating in the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 1890 decision in In 
re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890). The case 
questioned the President’s inherent 
authority to assign a U.S. Marshal 
to protect the life of Stephen Field, a 
sitting United States Supreme Court 
Justice. Marshal Neagle confronted 
the potential assailant, David Terry, 
and killed him when he thought 
Justice Field’s life was in danger. Cal-
ifornia authorities were none too 
THE LEGACY OF IN RE NEAGLE
Illustration, from The Life of David S. Terry, by A. E. Wagstaff, 1892, Internet Archive,  
http://www.archive.org/details/lifeofdavidsterr00wags, p. 410.
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pleased given that Terry had been so 
prominent in California political life 
and that Terry likely was unarmed. 
Local officials indicted and then im-
prisoned Neagle for killing the Cali-
fornian. 
Events leading up to the Supreme 
Court decision read like a soap opera, 
perhaps revealing more about the 
interplay of society and politics than 
does the decision itself. The history 
of the case starts with David Terry, 
who before the Civil War served 
on California’s Supreme Court with 
Justice Stephen Field. Terry gained 
notoriety by challenging Senator 
Broderick from California, a for-
mer friend who was also a friend of 
Field’s, to a duel, which left Broder-
ick dead. The dispute centered over 
political rivalries, in part due to 
Terry’s sympathy with the Confed-
eracy. Terry was acquitted and then 
left California to support the South 
in the Civil War. After the war, Terry 
returned to law practice and politics 
in California and, of relevance here, 
within twenty years fell within the 
orbit of an apparently glamorous but 
unstable woman named Sarah Al-
thea Hill.
In the late 1870s, Hill became 
the companion of Senator William 
Sharon of Nevada, who had amassed 
great sums from real estate and min-
ing investments. Sharon, who was 
much older than Hill, evidently sun-
dered relations when he suspected 
Hill’s designs on his money. Hill 
continued to plot how to separate 
Sharon from some of his enormous 
wealth. She made a demand on 
Sharon for alimony, asserting that 
Sharon had married her some three 
years earlier when they had started 
their “companionship.” In so do-
ing, she presented what likely were 
forged documents attesting to the 
marriage relationship. Sharon sued 
in federal court in California (due 
to diversity of citizenship) in 1883 
for a declaration that no marriage 
had ever taken place. Hill then filed 
her own suit in state court in 1884 to 
demonstrate that the marriage was 
valid and requested a share of Shar-
on’s property. She hired Terry as one 
of her attorneys.
The state court bizarrely decided 
the case in Hill’s favor even though 
the judge labeled Hill a liar. Sharon 
immediately appealed to the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court but died be-
fore the case was heard. His executor 
pursued the appeal.
In the meantime, the federal suit 
proceeded slowly, prompting more 
aberrant behavior from Hill. She 
sported a pistol at many of the pro-
ceedings, and waved it at witnesses. 
She threatened to have adverse wit-
nesses and their counsel killed. Al-
though Justice Field, by then serving 
on the U.S. Supreme Court, was not 
assigned to preside over the case, 
he was assigned as a Justice riding 
on circuit to hear several motions 
arising out of the case. During one 
proceeding, Justice Field in an effort 
to maintain decorum ordered that 
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Ms. Hill be disarmed, and he found 
her in contempt of court. At the end 
of the proceedings in 1886, the fed-
eral court determined that the mar-
riage was a sham and the documents 
forged.
Terry then married Hill, man-
ifesting an intriguing view of the 
attorney-client relationship. More 
importantly, the marriage placed 
pressure on his successors on the 
California Supreme Court to uphold 
the state court finding that Hill had 
been married to Sharon. A divided 
California Supreme Court acqui-
esced, affirming the trial court’s de-
cision that a valid marriage had in-
deed taken place.
In a complicated procedural 
move, the estate then moved to revive 
the federal court decree and enjoin 
both Hill and Terry from maintain-
ing the validity of the prior marriage, 
despite the state court ruling. At 
this point, the case was assigned to 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen 
Field, sitting by designation. Field 
in 1888 determined that Hill had 
obtained the marriage documents 
through fraud. As he orally delivered 
the decision, Hill caused a commo-
tion in the courtroom protesting the 
ruling and had to be escorted out. 
Terry in a display of chivalry there-
upon attacked the marshal for car-
rying out Field’s order. Field ordered 
both Terry, his former associate on 
the California Supreme Court, and 
Hill imprisoned for contempt of 
court. Hill threatened Field’s life, 
and Terry claimed that Field’s decision 
had been bought with Sharon’s money. 
Terry then sought a pardon from 
President Grover Cleveland, assert-
ing in part that Field was retaliating 
against him for refusing to throw his 
support to Field in a prior presiden-
tial primary. Cleveland declined, and 
Terry served out his short term.
Upon release, Terry apparently 
became even more consumed by 
revenge, broadcasting widely his 
intent to harm Justice Field. When 
Justice Field traveled back west from 
Washington, newspapers speculated 
on when the confrontation would 
occur. Accordingly, President Benja-
min Harrison through his Attorney 
General assigned Marshal Neagle to 
protect Justice Field.
  The confrontation arose in the summer of 1889 when Field 
traveled by train from San Francisco 
to Los Angeles. Terry and his wife 
boarded the train at a stop along 
the way and entered a dining room 
in which Justice Field was eating 
breakfast. Hill left the room—pre-
sumably to gather her pistol from her 
chamber—but her husband did not 
wait and circled behind Justice Field 
and delivered two blows to his head. 
Neagle, the marshal, announced his 
presence and called on Terry to stop. 
Terry made a move as if to draw a 
knife that he customarily carried, 
and Neagle responded with two 
shots from his pistol, killing the 
assailant.
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A local constable arrested Nea-
gle on the spot. Ms. Terry, upon her 
return to San Francisco, swore out a 
complaint for murder against both 
Field and Neagle. California author-
ities then arrested Field, who was 
released under a bond. An eastern 
newspaper reported the following 
imaginary dialogue:
Newsboy: “Man tried to kill a judge 
in California!”
Customer: “What was done about it?”
Newsboy: “Oh! They arrested the 
judge.”
Field immediately filed for a writ of 
habeas corpus, and the federal court 
within a matter of days granted 
Justice Field’s writ, ending Justice 
Field’s stay at the other end of the 
courtroom.
Marshal Neagle was not as for-
tunate—he unquestionably fired 
the shots that killed Terry. He filed 
a similar writ of habeas corpus from 
a California prison, asserting that 
he acted within the line of duty in 
protecting Justice Field’s life. He was 
moved to San Francisco, but remained 
behind bars. He argued that, to the ex-
tent his actions were undertaken pur-
suant to federal authority, his conduct 
could only be challenged in federal 
court. The federal court eventually 
scheduled a hearing, and upheld the 
writ, reasoning in part that “upon 
general, immutable principles, the 
power must be necessarily inherent 
in the executive department of any 
government worthy of the name of 
government, to protect itself in all 
matters to which its authority ex-
tends; and this necessarily involves 
Illustration, San Francisco Examiner, 1888, shows Terry attacking a marshal for removing 
Mrs. Terry from the courtroom, U.S. Marshals website, http://www.justice.gov/marshals.
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the power to protect all the agency 
and instrumentalities necessary to 
accomplish the objects and purposes 
of government.” The Supreme Court 
accepted the case for review at Cali-
fornia’s request.
On one level, In re Neagle reflects 
the generation-old conflict inherent 
in our system of federalism. Some 
Californians were resentful that the 
federal courts did not respect the 
state courts’ determination that a 
valid marriage had been entered into 
between Hill and Sharon. Moreover, 
authorities in California were more 
than willing to imprison and indict 
a U.S. Marshal, even when the Mar-
shal was following presidential or-
ders. Others in California believed 
that California courts should be 
trusted to determine whether Nea-
gle’s defense was valid without in-
terference from the federal courts. 
Whatever one thinks of the resur-
gent importance of federalism in our 
generation—including petitions for 
secession filed in the wake of Pres-
ident Obama’s 2012 victory—few 
proponents today would be so bold 
as to approve of California’s im-
prisonment of a U.S. Marshal who 
unquestionably was acting pursu-
ant to the President’s orders, not to 
mention local authorities’ decision 
to arrest Justice Field himself. The 
story reminds us that, no matter 
how intense regional divides may be 
today, they pale before the tensions 
between states and the federal gov-
ernment over a century ago.
But, the facts underlying the case 
reveal more—a sordid tale of love 
gone awry, reminiscent of politi-
cians’ struggles more recently, from 
Senator Gary Hart’s famed ride on 
the aptly named boat “Monkey Busi-
ness” to President Bill Clinton’s fling 
with an intern, and from Wilbur 
Mills’ dalliance with the Argentinian 
stripper Fanne Foxe to Representa-
Supreme Court decision in In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), photo by Emily Barney.
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tive Anthony Weiner’s more recent 
debacle of sexting. Politicians’ affairs 
impact not only political races, but 
Supreme Court decisions as well. 
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), 
was not the first Supreme Court case 
on presidential power sparked by 
politicians’ sexual misconduct.
The doctrinal legacy of In re Neagle endures. A divided U.S. 
Supreme Court, with Justice Field 
recusing himself, held that the Pres-
ident enjoys a residuum of authority 
under Article II of the Constitution 
to take steps to protect the nation 
even if those steps are not spelled 
out by Congress. In presaging pres-
idential power debates of the last 
decade, the Court concluded that 
the President could rely on pow-
ers not directly rooted in the text 
of the Constitution in safeguarding 
the country. The Court explained, 
“In the view we take of the Consti-
tution of the United States, any obli-
gation fairly and properly inferrible 
from that instrument” is appropri-
ate, including the duty to protect a 
Supreme Court Justice, even in the 
absence of explicit congressional 
authorization. The Court continued 
that “it would be a great reproach 
to the system of government of the 
United States, declared to be within 
its sphere sovereign and supreme, if 
there is to be found within the do-
main of its powers no means of pro-
tecting the judges, in the conscien-
tious and faithful discharge of their 
duties, from the malice and hatred of 
those upon whom their judgments 
may operate unfavorably.” Presidents 
can “infer” powers from the Consti-
tution—including the duty to pro-
tect Justices from harm. In the case, 
those nonstatutory or “inferrible” 
powers displaced California’s au-
thority to try Neagle for murder and 
provided Neagle a complete defense 
to the charge. Although the accumu-
lation of powers and responsibilities 
over the last 125 years has radically 
transformed the presidency, the de-
bate over the scope of presidential 
powers under Article II is not new. 
There is a residuum of authority un-
der Article II—even if the extent re-
mains in bitter dispute—permitting 
presidents leeway to ensure protec-
tion of the government and the na-
tion itself. ◆
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When Chicago-Kent Col-lege of Law was founded 125 years ago, many of 
our key legal institutions, such as the 
jury, were well established. By 1888, 
the year of our school’s founding, the 
jury was seen as an institution that 
provided justice in a nation created 
by a revolution of “we the people.” 
Although it no longer seems remark-
able to us today, the jury system gave 
ordinary citizens, untutored in the 
law, the power to decide cases and to 
dispense justice.
Today, reinforced by movies, 
television shows, and constant me-
dia coverage, the American people 
have two deeply-held views about 
the jury. The first is that the jury is 
meant to represent all of us—“we 
the people”—by reflecting our di-
versity as much as is practical. In 
every high-profile jury case, much 
attention is paid to the diversity of 
the jury. In particular, we care about 
race and gender more than almost 
any other characteristics. Although 
the diversity of the venire is en-
shrined in several Supreme Court 
cases, the diversity of the petit jury 
is reinforced by the portrayal of the 
jury in popular culture.
The second widely-held view is 
that the jury has one job, and that is 
to determine the facts. Although a 
jury trial is presided over by a judge 
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and involves decision-making about 
the law, the jury ostensibly plays no 
role in determining which laws ap-
ply or what standards should be met. 
This arrangement seems sensible be-
cause the judge and lawyers bring to 
the trial legal expertise that the ju-
rors do not have.
While these two views are well 
accepted, the students in our first 
law class in 1888 would be shocked 
to learn what our first-year students 
now take for granted. Though our 
modern impulse is to assume that 
a jury should reflect the diversity 
of our community, at one time that 
diversity was limited to white men 
of property. Our broader under-
standing of diversity has been the 
result of a hard-fought struggle to 
extend the rights of jury service to 
African-American men and later 
to women. This expansion of jury 
rights, however, has not been contin-
uous; rather, it has proceeded in fits 
and starts. In fact, African-Ameri-
can men in some states in the South 
were given the right to serve as jurors 
during Reconstruction only to have 
that right stripped away by the end 
of the 1800s before being restored 
decades later. So, too, with women 
in the Western territories; they had 
the right to serve as jurors in the late 
1800s, but it was short-lived.
It will also surprise the modern 
reader to discover that the role of the 
jury was initially to decide both the 
law and the facts. The diminution 
of the role of the jury, so that it de-
cided only the facts, happened grad-
ually from about 1850 to the 1930s. 
Some researchers believe that as the 
practice of law became more profes-
sional, the distinction widened be-
tween judges and lawyers who knew 
the law and ordinary citizens who 
did not, until it made little sense for 
jurors to decide the law.
I offer a more radical theory in 
which I see a connection between 
the growing diversity of the jury and 
the declining power of the jury. My 
theory is that the white, male legal 
establishment began to curtail the 
power of the jury as African-Amer-
ican men and women had the right 
to serve on juries. Although Afri-
can-American men and women lost 
that right by the late 1800s, they re-
gained it, albeit after much struggle, 
many decades later. For both groups, 
however, even when official barriers 
were eliminated, other practices kept 
them from actually being seated on 
juries. Some of these practices, such 
as the peremptory challenge, are still 
used today in a discriminatory man-
ner, in spite of Supreme Court cases 
to the contrary, in an effort to keep 
African-American men and women 
from being seated on juries.
   
The Exclusion of African-American 
Men from the Jury
Albert Alschuler and Andrew Deiss, in an article entitled A 
Brief History of the Criminal Jury in 
the United States, identified 1860 as 
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the year in which African-American 
men first served on a jury. In that 
year, two African-American men sat 
on a jury in Worcester, Massachu-
setts. In 1864, Congress passed leg-
islation that allowed African-Amer-
ican men to testify in federal courts, 
and this was followed by legislation 
that allowed them to testify in state 
courts. Jury service was soon to fol-
low.
During Reconstruction (1863–
1877), African-American men served 
on juries in some states. For example, 
in South Carolina in 1869, the leg-
islature mandated not only the in-
tegration of grand and petit juries, 
but also that the racial composition 
of the jury should approximate that 
of the community. Similarly, in New 
Orleans between 1872 and 1878, 
one-third of the citizens summoned 
for jury duty were African-Ameri-
cans, and this percentage matched 
their representation in Orleans 
Parish. Between 1870 and 1884 in 
Washington County, Texas, where 
African-Americans were approxi-
mately 50 percent of the population, 
they constituted about 30 percent of 
those who served on juries. During 
the 1870s, in Warren County, Mis-
sissippi, African-Americans were 
about 35 percent of the grand jurors, 
and even though that percentage did 
not approximate their percentage in 
the community (where they were 70 
percent of the community), it was a 
significant improvement over their 
total exclusion in the past.
Newspapers, in their reporting of 
jury trials during this period, noted 
when an African-American man 
(and they were only men) served as 
a juror. On January 15, 1884, in the 
Chicago Daily Tribune, one story 
questioned whether South Carolina 
jurors in a particular case had voted 
to convict based on their political 
parties; it included the following ob-
servation: “Three of the jurors, one 
a negro and two white men, refused 
to find a verdict of guilty.” On Feb-
ruary 16, 1885, in the Chicago Daily 
Tribune, a story described a murder 
trial in New Orleans and mentioned 
the sole African-American juror on 
this jury: “The only juror who stood 
out from the very beginning in fa-
vor of conviction was one Edwards, 
a negro, and the only negro on the 
jury, and he maintained his manly 
and honest position to the end, not-
withstanding that [the defendant’s] 
friends went to his house while he 
was serving and threatened his fam-
ily with violence.”
The newspaper accounts also 
noted when the African-American 
juror was the first African-Amer-
ican to serve in that locale. A brief 
story on May 6, 1891, in the New 
York Times announced that a man 
named Nelson Stark, described as 
“colored,” had been selected as the 
eleventh juror in the Garrison mur-
der trial. The story noted that “[it] is 
the first time in the history of that 
county [in West Virginia] that a col-
ored man has sat on an important 
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case in the State court.” Similarly, 
on September 7, 1880, the Chicago 
Daily Tribune noted that “[f]or the 
first time in the history of Kentucky 
the panel of jurymen for the duty 
in a criminal court included in the 
list of the Louisville Circuit Court 
to-day three colored men.” Two of 
those men were selected to serve on 
a grand jury and the third man was 
selected for a petit jury. The article 
noted that there were a number of 
African-Americans at court that day 
and “they evidently took great satis-
faction in seeing representatives of 
their race assume privileges hereto-
fore denied them.”
The inclusion of African-Ameri-
can men on the jury was not limited 
to Southern states. A notice in the 
New York Times on November 19, 
1890, announced that “[a]mong the 
jurors in a case in the Circuit Court 
this morning was Abe Peterson, a 
Grafton blacksmith, who is the first 
colored man to sit on a jury in Rens-
salaer County[, New York].” On July 
9, 1893, a lengthy story in the Chi-
cago Daily Tribune reported that for 
the first time in Madison, Wiscon-
sin, an all-African-American jury 
(six jurors) heard a civil case involv-
ing an assault and battery; the arti-
cle noted that this jury marked “an 
inauguration of a new judicial era.”
Newspaper accounts of jury tri-
als also reported on perceived dif-
ferences between white jurors and 
African-American jurors. Accord-
ing to one story in the Chicago Daily 
Tribune on July 10, 1880, “[t]he first 
negro juror in Atlanta, the other day, 
promptly joined in convicting a ne-
gro who was put on trial.” As a result 
of African-Americans’ seeming pro-
clivity to convict, “[t]he next pris-
oner, also a negro, objected to hav-
ing one of his own race on the jury.” 
Another story, published in the New 
York Times on November 3, 1885, 
also observed that African-Amer-
ican jurors had been “decidedly 
in favor of the Commonwealth as 
against colored offenders.” The arti-
cle suggested that African-American 
jurors wanted to show that they were 
committed to law and order—so 
much so that older lawyers who had 
African-American clients would not 
select African-American jurors be-
“Negroes as Jurors,” New York Times headline, Nov. 3, 1885.
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cause “they claim[ed] that colored 
jurors are more severe in meting 
out punishment to offenders of their 
race.”
In spite of constitutional protec-
tions provided by the Fourteenth 
Amendment (1868) and the Fifteenth 
Amendment (1870), statutory pro-
tections provided by the Ku Klux 
Klan Act of 1871, the Federal Civil 
Rights Act of 1875, and the Federal 
Jury Selection Act of 1879, and a 
U.S. Supreme 
Court case, 
Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 
100 U.S. 303 
(1880), which 
held that a state 
statute dis-
qualifying Af-
rican-Amer-
ican men from jury service was 
unconstitutional, African-American 
men lost their place on juries in the 
South in the 1890s. Booker T. Wash-
ington observed at the end of the 
nineteenth century: “In the whole 
of Georgia & Alabama, and other 
Southern states not a negro juror is 
allowed to sit in the jury box in state 
courts.” According to a 1910 study, 
African-Americans rarely served on 
juries in Florida, Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, South Carolina, and 
Virginia, and they never served on 
juries in Alabama and Georgia. In 
sum, according to another commen-
tator, Douglas Colbert, “[a]lthough 
it was common for blacks to have 
served as jurors during Reconstruc-
tion, they virtually disappeared from 
the southern jury box by 1900, even 
in counties where they constituted 
an overwhelming majority of the lo-
cal population.”
Even though statutes could no 
longer prohibit African-American 
men from serving on the jury after 
Strauder, other practices kept them 
from the jury 
box. James 
Forman, in Ju-
ries and Race 
in the Nine-
teenth Cen-
tury, described 
the violence 
directed to-
ward Afri-
can-Americans and white Repub-
licans that kept African-American 
men in the South from serving as 
jurors or witnesses, or seeking or 
being afforded the protection of the 
legal system. All-white Southern ju-
ries failed to convict the white per-
petrators of these crimes.  
Nonviolent and more subtle 
practices also kept African-Amer-
icans from actually being seated on 
a jury, even if they had been sum-
moned to serve. These practices 
ranged from color-coding by race 
the names placed in the wheel from 
which jurors were selected to the 
discretion exercised by white jury 
commissioners in selecting only 
“Jury of Whites and Blacks,” illustration by James E. 
Taylor, 1867, Library of Congress.
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white men whom they knew to serve 
as jurors. Mississippi’s 1892 law, 
which allowed three state officials to 
select jurors based on their “good in-
telligence, sound judgment, and fair 
character,” was another way to keep 
African-Americans off the jury; 
other Southern states followed suit.
The practice of discriminatory 
peremptory challenges, which con-
tinues to this day, was another way 
to keep African-Americans from 
being selected for petit juries. Each 
party could exercise a certain num-
ber of peremptories and use them 
to remove prospective jurors with-
out giving any reason at all. Parties 
used their peremptory challenges to 
remove African-Americans from the 
jury. Prosecutors, in particular, exer-
cised race-based peremptories to re-
move African-Americans from the 
jury in criminal cases in which the 
defendant was African-American. 
Even after a number of cases, from 
the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, in 
which the Supreme Court developed 
an elaborate framework to attempt 
to counter the exercise of race-based 
peremptory challenges, the practice 
continues today. Lawyers have sim-
ply learned ways to avoid discovery. 
In some courts in the South, defense 
lawyers in capital cases will not even 
challenge the prosecutor’s use of a 
race-based peremptory because they 
know the judge will never find a pe-
remptory to be discriminatory. The 
practice of exercising discriminatory 
peremptory challenges persists, even 
though it is undertaken in more sub-
tle ways than it once was.
The Exclusion of Women from the Jury
Women’s experience in serv-ing as jurors tracked Afri-
can-American men’s experience in 
some ways, but lagged behind by 
many years. Before 1888, women in 
at least two Western territories were 
permitted to serve as jurors, and in 
1898 women in Utah were permitted 
to serve as jurors. Wyoming Terri-
tory gave women the right to vote 
and to sit on juries in 1869, with the 
first woman sitting on a jury in La-
ramie, Wyoming, in 1871. However, 
there is some dispute as to when 
Wyoming women lost their right to 
sit on juries. Albert Alschuler and 
Andrew Deiss point to 1872 as the 
year that “Wyoming’s experiment in 
equality in the courtroom” came to 
an end, and a New York Times arti-
cle on November 19, 1883, claimed 
that “no woman [in Wyoming] is 
ever seen nowadays in the jury box.” 
However, in an article in the Chicago 
Daily Tribune on October 26, 1891, 
the first Governor of the State of 
Wyoming was interviewed and said 
that there had been “several women 
jurors in the courts of Cheyenne, the 
Capital of Wyoming.” The Wyoming 
Almanac of Politics included an arti-
cle from the Cheyenne Daily Leader, 
dated September 17, 1891, describ-
ing a trial in which the defendant 
was female as were two of the jurors. 
Then & Now: Stories of Law and Progress72
In 1884, women in Washington Ter-
ritory had the right to vote and to 
serve on juries. However, in 1887, 
after a change in personnel on the 
Supreme Court of Washington Terri-
tory, women lost their right to sit on 
juries. In 1898, Utah allowed women 
to serve as jurors, and has tradition-
ally been credited as the first state to 
do so, though women rarely served 
as jurors until the 1930s.
Although there were few women 
serving as jurors in the 1880s, there 
were occasional ruminations about 
what women jurors would be like 
and what difference they would 
make on juries. In a brief note in 
the Chicago Daily Tribune on April 
21, 1888, entitled Call for Feminine 
Jurors, the writer suggested that it is 
difficult to convict a female defen-
dant on the West Coast, and perhaps 
if women were permitted to serve as 
jurors this situation would change. 
The writer offered the following rec-
ommendation: “It would be a good 
thing if the rights of women could 
be so extended that in cases where 
a woman is accused of crime she 
might be tried by a jury of her own 
sex.” On June 28, 1893, there was a 
brief article in the Chicago Daily 
Tribune entitled Women as Jurors, 
which raised the question whether 
Lizzie Borden should have been 
tried by a jury that included women 
because “a woman on trial for her 
life should have the right to demand 
an equal representation of women 
on the jury.” However, the same ar-
ticle also suggested that whenever 
the defendant is a woman, “there 
are few men not predisposed to re-
gard the opposite sex with tender 
consideration.” In 1893, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee held a hearing 
to consider a bill that would allow 
women to serve as jurors if they “are 
wives of men who are duly qualified 
so to act,” according to an article in 
the New York Times on February 1, 
1893. The article reported that Dr. 
Mary Walker spoke in support of the 
bill, but the bill did not go forward.
Women thought the passage 
of the Nineteenth Amendment in 
1920, which gave them the right to 
vote, would also give them the right 
to serve on juries, but this proved 
not to be the case in most states. 
According to Professor Gretchen 
Ritter, around the time of the Nine-
teenth Amendment, 14 states granted 
women the right to serve on the jury. 
In seven of these states, new laws 
were passed that gave women the 
right to serve. In the other seven 
states, jury-qualification statutes de-
scribed jurors as “electors,” so once 
women became electors under the 
Nineteenth Amendment, they auto-
matically became eligible to serve as 
jurors. However, other states, like Il-
linois, rejected this idea. The Illinois 
Supreme Court reasoned that at the 
time when the Illinois General As-
sembly used the term “electors” only 
men could be electors. If women 
were to be included as “electors,” 
then it was up to the Illinois General 
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Assembly to say so, which it did, 
though not until 1939.
States decided whether to allow 
women to serve on juries in their 
own courts, and the federal courts 
followed the practice of the state in 
which the federal court was located. 
It was not until the Civil Rights Act 
of 1957 that federal courts allowed 
women to serve as jurors in federal 
courts regardless of the practice 
of that state’s courts. State courts, 
even when they ostensibly per-
mitted women to serve as jurors, 
followed practices that kept many 
women from actually serving. In 
some states, women had automatic 
exemptions from jury duty. In other 
states, such as Florida and Louisiana, 
women could serve as jurors, but 
only if they went down to the court-
house and affirmatively registered 
for service, which was an extra step 
that men did not have to take. States 
that adhered to this practice claimed 
that it respected women’s role in the 
home and that most women would 
be unable to serve because of their 
duties at home. The effect of affirma-
tive registration was that very few 
women registered for jury service. 
As late as 1961, this practice was up-
held in Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 
(1961), and was not found to be un-
constitutional until Taylor v. Louisi-
ana, 419 U.S. 522, 533 (1975).
Even after the demise of affir-
mative registration, the exercise of 
peremptory challenges was another 
way to keep women from serving 
as jurors. Although women were 
summoned to serve, they could be 
struck from the petit jury by lawyers 
exercising gender-based peremptory 
challenges. Whereas race-based pe-
remptory challenges were addressed 
by the Supreme Court in a series of 
cases spanning from the mid-1960s 
to the mid-1990s, this line of cases 
did not become applicable to gen-
der until J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. 
T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). Although 
there are many reasons that lawyers 
defend the peremptory challenge—
from giving defendants control over 
jury selection to ridding the jury 
of an outlier who could not be dis-
missed for cause—the peremptory 
challenge also should be seen as a 
practice that has been, and contin-
ues to be, used to keep women and 
African-Americans from serving on 
juries.
A Decline in Jury Power
Back in 1888, when Afri-can-American men had for all 
intents and purposes lost their right 
to serve on juries and the few women 
in Western territories still had their 
short-lived right to serve on juries, 
the jury had begun to experience 
a decline in power. Whereas the 
jury—from colonial times until the 
1850s—had always had the power to 
decide the law and the facts, the jury 
started to lose its power to decide 
the law and was reduced to deciding 
only the facts. This loss came about 
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through state court interpretations 
of state statutes and constitutions. 
This loss could be seen in a number 
of states, including Massachusetts 
in 1855 and Louisiana in 1871, and 
soon spread to other states, includ-
ing Georgia in 1879 and Vermont in 
1892. Today, only two states, Indiana 
and Maryland, still instruct jurors 
that they have the right to determine 
the law as well as the facts. Although 
these two states’ constitutions pro-
vide for this right, the judiciary in 
both states has narrowed this right 
through case law.
My own theory is that as Afri-
can-American men and women 
sought to serve on juries, there was 
a move on the part of judges to limit 
the power of juries. Some commen-
tators suggest that this move came 
about because of the growing profes-
sionalization of judges. As judges re-
ceived legal training and saw them-
selves as professionals, they began 
to see the functions of judges and 
juries as distinct, and attempted to 
limit juries to the fact-finding func-
tion only. Another possibility is that 
as the law grew more complex, it 
seemed appropriate for professionals 
with training and knowledge to de-
cide it, rather than citizens who had 
only common sense and experience 
to guide them. My own theory is that 
the move to limit the function of the 
jury to fact-finding came about at a 
time when outsiders—women and 
African-Americans—were trying to 
claim a right to serve as jurors. Al-
Sources and Further Reading
■ Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief 
History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 867 (1994).
■ Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: 
Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the 
Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1 (1990).
■ James Forman, Jr., Juries and Race in the Nine-
teenth Century, 113 Yale L.J. 895 (2004).
■ Holly J. McCammon, The U.S. Women’s Jury 
Movements and Strategic Adaptation (2012).
■ Gretchen Ritter, Jury Service and Women’s Cit-
izenship before and after the Nineteenth Amend-
ment, 20 Law & Hist. Rev. 479 (2002).
Nancy S. Marder graduated summa 
cum laude from Yale College and re-
ceived her master’s degree in interna-
tional relations from Cambridge Univer-
sity and her law degree from Yale Law 
School. After clerking at every level of the 
federal judiciary, including two years as 
a law clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens at 
the U.S. Supreme Court, she began teach-
ing. Professor Marder’s areas of research 
include juries, judges, and courts. She 
thanks Sam Castree ’13 for his excellent 
research assistance.
though African-American men and 
women had not yet been able to se-
cure their right to serve, the writing 
was on the wall.
Thus, the late 1880s were a time 
of transformation for the jury. Juries 
in many states had lost their power 
to decide the law, and were officially 
limited to finding the facts. It is no 
coincidence that this occurred at a 
time when African-American men 
and women had experienced the 
right to serve as jurors, albeit briefly, 
and sought to recover that right, 
even though it would take them 
many years to do so. ◆
•
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After examining the United States Reports containing the cases decided by the Su-
preme Court during its 1887–88 
term, one might conclude that the 
United States in the late 1880s was 
a law-abiding country with little 
crime. Of the approximately 270 
cases decided by the Court during 
that term, only seven (2.6 percent) 
raised issues of criminal law or pro-
cedure. In contrast, in its most re-
cently completed term, 2011–12, the 
Supreme Court decided 76 cases, 22 
(29 percent) of which involved is-
sues of criminal law or procedure.
What accounts for this dramatic 
rise in the number (and percentage) 
of criminal law or procedure cases 
decided by the Supreme Court? No 
one would deny that crime in the 
United States has increased since 
1888. But the true explanation for 
the increased number of criminal law 
and procedure cases decided by the 
Supreme Court is the “constitutional-
ization” of criminal procedure. When 
originally adopted in 1791, the Bill of 
Rights (the first eight amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution) placed limita-
tions only upon the Federal Govern-
ment, not upon the individual States. 
Consequently, none of the rights pro-
vided in those amendments—such 
as the protection against unreason-
able searches and seizures (Fourth 
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Amendment), the guarantee against 
double jeopardy (Fifth Amendment), 
the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion (Fifth Amendment), the right 
to counsel (Sixth Amendment), the 
right to a jury trial (Sixth Amend-
ment), and the right to confront hos-
tile witnesses (Sixth Amendment)—
applied in criminal prosecutions 
brought in state courts. Hence, an 
individual convicted of a crime in a 
state court could not challenge his or 
her conviction in the U.S. Supreme 
Court on the ground that he or she 
had been denied a right guaranteed 
in the Bill of Rights. Many states did 
of course have their own constitu-
tional provisions guaranteeing vari-
ous rights to those accused of crime 
in their own courts, but each state 
could interpret its own constitutional 
provisions, and many of these provi-
sions turned out to be less protective 
of individual rights than their federal 
counterparts. Moreover, since these 
were rights guaranteed by state law, 
rather than federal law, their alleged 
violation did not raise a federal issue 
that could be adjudicated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.
Even in 1888, after the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment—which, among other things, 
prohibits a State from abridging 
the “privileges and immunities” of 
United States citizens (“Privileges 
and Immunities Clause”) and from 
“depriving any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of 
law” (“Due Process Clause”)—the 
Bill of Rights still provided no pro-
tection to state criminal defendants.
Shortly after the turn of the twen-
tieth century, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tected some individual rights from 
state infringement, including, per-
haps, some safeguarded by the Bill 
of Rights against National action. 
Nevertheless, the Court expressly 
stated that if the Due Process Clause 
protected such latter rights, it was 
not because they were enumerated 
in the first eight amendments. It ex-
plained that the Due Process Clause 
protected only those rights that are 
“the very essence of a scheme of or-
dered liberty” and essential to “a fair 
and enlightened system of justice.” 
In determining whether a particu-
lar safeguard met this standard, the 
Court asked whether “a civilized sys-
tem could be imagined that would 
not accord the particular protec-
tion.” Applying this test, the Supreme 
Court held that several of the protec-
tions contained in the Bill of Rights, 
including the privilege against self-in-
crimination and the right to a grand 
jury indictment, did not apply to the 
States. Even when the Court held that 
a particular right enumerated in the 
Bill of Rights fell within the concept 
of due process, it frequently con-
cluded that the protection afforded 
against state infringement was less 
than that afforded against infringe-
ment by the Federal Government— 
a “watered-down” version of the right.
Then & Now: Stories of Law and Progress78
To illustrate, although the Fifth 
Amendment guarantee against 
double jeopardy precluded the 
Government in a federal criminal 
prosecution from appealing a jury 
verdict—whether a conviction or 
an acquittal—that protection did 
not apply in state court proceedings. 
Consequently, in the mid-1930s, 
after a Connecticut jury consider-
ing a charge of first-degree murder 
against Frank Palko convicted him 
of second-degree murder (thereby 
implicitly acquitting him of the orig-
inal charge of first-degree murder), 
the State, acting pursuant to a state 
statute, sought review of the con-
viction. The State claimed the trial 
judge had erred in instructing the 
jury on first-degree murder and in 
excluding certain evidence from the 
prosecution’s case. The Connecticut 
Supreme Court agreed; it reversed 
the conviction (and life sentence) 
and, despite Palko’s implicit acquittal 
for that offense, ordered a new trial 
for first-degree murder. At the sec-
ond trial, a jury convicted Palko of 
first-degree murder, and he was sen-
tenced to death—a conviction and 
sentence that the Supreme Court ul-
timately upheld against a claim that 
Palko’s second trial had placed him 
twice in jeopardy for first-degree 
murder.
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the Supreme Court consistently 
rejected the view, persuasively ar-
gued by Justice Hugo L. Black, that 
the Fourteenth Amendment had “in-
corporated” the entire Bill of Rights 
and made its provisions applicable to 
the States to the same extent as they 
applied to the Federal Government. 
Even as late as 1961, despite the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee that an ac-
cused in a criminal prosecution “shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defense,” an 
indigent being tried in a state court 
for a noncapital felony had no federal 
constitutional right to have counsel 
appointed to represent him or her. 
Thus, when Clarence Earl Gideon, an 
indigent drifter being tried in a Flor-
ida state court for breaking and en-
tering a poolroom, requested the trial 
court to appoint counsel to represent 
him, the judge could respond:
Photo of Clarence Earl Gideon, 1961(?), State 
Archives of Florida, Florida Memory, RC12789.
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Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I can-
not appoint Counsel to represent 
you in this case. Under the laws of 
the State of Florida, the only time 
the Court can appoint Counsel to 
represent a Defendant is when that 
person is charged with a capital of-
fense. I am sorry, but I will have 
to deny your request to appoint 
Counsel to defend you in this case.
During the 1960s, however, un-
der the leadership of Chief Justice 
Earl Warren, the Supreme Court 
adopted the position that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment “selectively incorpo-
rated” various provisions of the Bill 
of Rights and made them applicable 
to the States. Using this approach, 
the Court held that the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, the Fifth Amendment guar-
antee against double jeopardy, the 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial, and, in overturning Clarence 
Earl Gideon’s conviction, the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel were 
among the rights safeguarded from 
infringement by the states. In 1968, 
the Court explained that it had re-
formulated its test for determining 
whether a particular provision of 
the Bill of Rights was incorporated 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. It 
stated:
The recent cases . . . have pro-
ceeded upon the valid assump-
tion that state criminal processes 
are not imaginary and theoretical 
schemes but actual systems bearing 
virtually every characteristic of the 
common-law system that has been 
developing virtually contemporane-
ously in England and in this country. 
The question thus is whether given 
this kind of system a particular pro-
cedure is fundamental—whether, 
that is, a procedure is necessary to 
an Anglo-American regime of or-
dered liberty. [Emphasis added.]
Today, virtually all of the provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights safeguard-
ing the rights of a criminal defendant 
apply to the States (the lone exception 
being the right to an indictment). As 
a result, the Supreme Court each 
term receives hundreds of petitions 
requesting it to review a state-court 
conviction alleged to have been ob-
tained in violation of the defendant’s 
federal constitutional rights, and each 
year the Court decides 20 or so cases 
involving such issues, a large percent-
age of the number of cases it decides 
each term with written opinions. ◆
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The Supreme Court in 1888 was in crisis. Its structure and responsibilities, created 
a century earlier by the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, were no longer ade-
quate or appropriate. The Court was 
overwhelmed by its docket, and the 
justices’ responsibilities, which in-
cluded circuit riding, were impos-
sible to meet. Shaped as it was by 
a law almost as old as the country 
itself, the Supreme Court in 1888—
and the federal judicial system as a 
whole—would be barely recogniz-
able to many today.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 estab-
lished not only the Supreme Court, 
but also the entire federal court 
system. The Act divided the coun-
try initially into thirteen districts, 
which were in turn combined into 
three circuits. Unlike today’s circuit 
courts, however, the circuit courts 
created in 1789 had original jurisdic-
tion over certain types of cases and 
provided appellate review of only 
a few cases heard originally in the 
district courts. In addition, the Judi-
ciary Act provided for district court 
judges and Supreme Court justices, 
but no circuit court judges. Instead, 
twice a year, two Supreme Court 
justices would visit each district and, 
along with one district court judge, 
would sit as the circuit court. There 
were six Supreme Court justices, so 
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THE MAKING OF THE MODERN SUPREME COURT
“Our overworked Supreme Court,” Puck cartoon by Joseph Keppler, 1885, Library of Congress.
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that two could be assigned to each 
circuit. Even after 1793, when sub-
sequent laws provided that only 
one Supreme Court justice at a time 
would sit on a circuit court, meaning 
that each justice had to make the trip 
only once a year rather than twice, 
an enormous portion of Supreme 
Court justices’ time was spent riding 
circuit—at a time when travel was 
slow and difficult. And as the coun-
try grew, more circuits were created.
Not only did Supreme Court 
justices ride circuit, but the Supreme 
Court itself had no discretion over 
its docket. Cases were appealed to 
the Supreme Court as of right, unlike 
today. This lack of control turned out 
to be extremely problematic. During 
the first century of its existence, not 
only did the United States become 
geographically larger and more pop-
ulous, but industry grew, the coun-
try’s economy became increasingly 
sophisticated, and new laws and 
sources of litigation abounded, espe-
cially after the Civil War. As a result, 
the Supreme Court’s docket grew 
dramatically. At the beginning of the 
1888 Term, there were 1,563 cases on 
the docket. The Court simply could 
not keep up. As Felix Frankfurter 
and James M. Landis described 
the situation: “The Supreme Court 
docket became a record of arrears.” 
Less poetically, it took three years for 
a case to be heard. The situation was 
untenable.
Faced with overwhelming case-
loads, by 1888 the Supreme Court 
had already attempted to adjust its 
standard of review in order to dis-
suade lawyers and litigants from 
appealing fact-intensive cases with 
few implications beyond the partic-
ular parties. In Newell v. Norton and 
Ship, an 1865 admiralty case involv-
ing a steamboat collision, for exam-
ple, the Court summarily affirmed 
the verdict for the plaintiff, holding 
that there was “ample testimony to 
support the decision.” The Court 
explained that it would not engage 
in a searching review of the lengthy 
record, which included more than 
100 depositions:
 
Parties ought not to expect this court 
to revise their decrees merely on a 
doubt raised in our minds as to the 
correctness of their judgment, on 
the credibility of witnesses, or the 
weight of conflicting testimony.
The Court’s reluctance to engage 
in error correction, even at a time when 
it had no formal control of its docket, 
continues to this day. Today, Supreme 
Court Rule 10, Considerations Gov-
erning Review on Writ of Certiorari, 
explains that a “petition for a writ of 
certiorari is rarely granted when the 
asserted error consists of erroneous 
factual findings or the misapplica-
tion of a properly stated rule of law.”
Then & Now: Stories of Law and Progress82
Despite the Court’s effort to de-fine a very narrow scope of re-
view, it was unable to halt the flood 
of cases coming to it. Facing both its 
own swelling docket and the geo-
graphic expansion of the country, 
the justices found circuit riding to be 
increasingly difficult and they often 
simply did not do it. As Frankfurter 
and Landis explain, “[B]y 1890 the 
statutory duty of the Justices to at-
tend circuit was practically a dead 
letter.”
And it was not the Supreme 
Court alone that was unable to func-
tion properly. Despite some earlier 
attempts to expand and reform the 
lower courts, there were still not 
nearly enough judges. Circuit courts, 
which were supposed to sit with two 
judges, often had to function with 
only one. Even more problematic, 
that single judge was often a district 
court judge who was hearing appeals 
of his own decisions. In 1889, a pa-
per presented at the Annual Meeting 
of the American Bar Association put 
it this way:
Such an appeal is not from Philip 
drunk to Philip sober, but from 
Philip sober to Philip intoxicated 
with the vanity of a matured opin-
ion and doubtless also a published 
decision.
This arrangement could not possibly 
inspire confidence in an impartial 
and fair justice system.
Congress finally acted in 1891, 
after many years of considering and 
rejecting proposals for major reform, 
and the federal judicial system we 
know today began to emerge. Most 
significantly, Congress established 
intermediate appellate courts for the 
first time. If litigants were required 
to appeal first to those intermediate 
courts, the hope was, many fewer of 
them would subsequently take their 
cases to the Supreme Court. The law 
indeed appeared to lessen the tide of 
cases, at least at first. During 1890, 
before passage, 623 new cases were 
docketed at the Supreme Court. In 
1892, the number dropped by more 
than half, to 275.
The 1891 law, known as the Evarts 
Act, also contained the seeds of to-
day’s Court’s largely discretionary 
jurisdiction. For the first time, Con-
gress created a category of cases that 
the Supreme Court would review 
only upon certification, or certiorari, 
although most cases continued to 
flow to the Court as a matter of right.
The Supreme Court embraced 
the opportunity to limit the num-
ber of cases coming before it. Dur-
ing the first two years after passage 
of the 1891 act, it granted certiorari 
in only two cases. While careful 
to maintain its power to grant cer-
tiorari in any case pending in the 
courts of appeals, the Court was, 
quite deliberately, “chary of action in 
respect to certiorari,” as it explained 
in Forsyth v. City of Hammond, de-
cided in 1897. In Forsyth, the Court 
announced narrow criteria for when 
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certiorari would be appropriate:
[The certiorari] power will be 
sparingly exercised, and only when 
the circumstances of the case sat-
isfy us that the importance of the 
question involved, the necessity of 
avoiding conflict between two or 
more courts of appeal, or between 
courts of appeal and the courts of a 
state, or some matter affecting the 
interests of this nation in its inter-
nal or external relations, demands 
such exercise.
These criteria remain, largely un-
changed, the stated criteria for cer-
tiorari today as set forth in Supreme 
Court Rule 10.
The Evarts Act, however, was 
not successful in its goal of cutting 
the Court’s workload to a manage-
able size. It did not eliminate most 
of the Court’s mandatory appellate 
jurisdiction. The hope that the cre-
ation of the intermediate appellate 
courts would satisfy litigants’ need 
for appellate review, thereby making 
an appeal to the Supreme Court less 
attractive, proved largely illusory. 
(Lawyers and litigants often appar-
ently used the right of an appeal to 
the Supreme Court simply as a de-
laying tactic, a possibility that seems 
entirely obvious to a modern legal 
audience.) In the years following the 
enactment of the Evarts Act, the Su-
preme Court’s caseloads increased 
again to unmanageable proportions, 
as the nation, its economy, and its 
judicial business continued to grow. 
Moreover, even after 1891 and de-
spite the concern for the Supreme 
Court’s caseload that inspired the 
Evarts Act, Congress continued to 
create even more categories of man-
“The Supreme Court/Men Who Know the Law,” October Term, 1895. Designed by the American Lithographic Co., 
1896, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States.
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datory appeals to the Court. In 1903, 
for example, it passed the Expediting 
Act, which created the three-judge 
district court to hear certain anti-
trust cases. Appeals from this type 
of district court went directly to the 
Supreme Court as of right. And over 
the following 10 to 15 years, Con-
gress provided that more and more 
types of cases follow this procedure. 
(A handful of cases, such as consti-
tutional challenges to congressional 
districts, are subject to this proce-
dure even today.)
Although it expanded the Court’s 
mandatory jurisdiction in some ar-
eas, Congress did cut back on it in 
others. In 1916, for example, Con-
gress eliminated mandatory juris-
diction over Federal Employers’ Li-
ability Act cases, as well as certain 
cases arising out of state courts, cases 
from the Philippines, and cases aris-
ing under certain other federal stat-
utes. The most significant overhaul 
of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, 
however, was the 1925 Judges’ Bill—
so called because it was drafted by 
members of the Supreme Court it-
self. The Act dramatically expanded 
the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction, 
leaving only a few, relatively small 
categories of cases for mandatory 
appeals.
The goal of the Judges’ Bill, like 
the Evarts Act, was to free the Court 
from having to decide cases that were 
not important to anyone beyond 
the immediate parties involved and 
to allow it to focus on more nation-
ally significant matters. The House 
Committee report on the Judges’ Bill 
explained:
The problem is whether the time 
and attention and energy of the 
court shall be devoted to matters 
of large public concern, or whether 
they shall be consumed by matters 
of less concern, without especial 
general interest, and only because 
the litigant wants to have the court 
of last resort pass upon his right.
In a 1925 Yale Law Review article, 
Chief Justice William Howard Taft 
provided more detail about what 
sorts of cases he believed the Court 
should take on certiorari after pas-
sage of the Judges’ Bill, reiterating 
the criteria the Court first articu-
lated in the 1890s—and that today 
are embodied in Rule 10:
The function of the Supreme 
Court is conceived to be . . . the 
consideration of cases whose deci-
sion involves principles, the appli-
cation of which are of wide pub-
lic or governmental interest, and 
which should be authoritatively 
declared by the final court. Such 
cases should include issues of the 
Federal constitutional validity of 
statutes, Federal and State, genuine 
issues of constitutional rights of 
individuals, the interpretation of 
Federal statutes when it will affect 
large classes of people, questions 
of Federal jurisdiction, and some-
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times doubtful questions of gen-
eral law of such wide application 
that the Supreme Court may help 
remove the doubt. Where there 
is a conflict of opinion between 
intermediate appellate courts in 
the different Circuits or between 
the Federal intermediate appellate 
courts and the Supreme Courts of 
the States, the public interest cer-
tainly requires that the Supreme 
Court hear the cases, if its decision 
will remove the conflict.
The Judges’ Bill did not com-
pletely eliminate caseload pressures, 
of course. Petitions for certiorari alone 
topped 5,000 a year by the early 1980s. 
In October Term 2011, the Court con-
sidered more than 7,500 petitions, 
although this number represents a 
modest decrease from prior years. 
Despite these massive numbers, 
however, the Court has not fallen 
behind in dealing with these filings. 
Instead, it has adopted a variety 
of ways of dealing with them effi-
ciently—from eliminating the need 
to discuss a petition in the justices’ 
conference unless at least one justice 
wants to consider it, to relying on 
law clerks to read the petitions and 
summarize them in brief memos. 
This latter mechanism relies heavily 
on the “cert pool”—a cooperative 
agreement among most of the jus-
tices (currently, all but Justice Alito) 
in which the petitions are divided 
among the chambers and each petition 
is assigned to a single law clerk. The 
cert pool was introduced in the 1970s.
For cases decided on the merits, 
however, the Court continued to 
feel greatly burdened by its work-
load in the mid- to late twentieth 
century, even as the number of merits 
cases shrank. In the 1980s, the Court 
heard argument and issued written 
opinions in approximately 150 cases 
a year. Many observers, and some of 
the justices themselves, believed that 
150 cases were simply too many for 
the Court to handle well. Moreover, 
these people argued, the Court was 
unable to give truly important cases 
the time and attention they needed 
in part because of the need to man-
age the mandatory appeals, which 
were often not of interest beyond the 
parties themselves. There was much 
discussion of some kind of national 
court of appeals or other panel to 
assist the Supreme Court with the 
more mundane cases. Then-Justice 
William H. Rehnquist explained at 
his 1986 confirmation hearings to be 
Chief Justice:
I think if Congress could be per-
suaded, not ultimately but very 
presently, there ought to be a 
new national court, frankly 
recognized as such, with judges 
appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate, who 
would act as something of a junior 
chamber of the Supreme Court, 
to hear primarily statutory cases 
about which there are presently 
conflicts in the circuit[s].
Then & Now: Stories of Law and Progress86
As we all know, no such dramatic change occurred. During the 
1970s, Congress eliminated man-
datory jurisdiction in a number of 
types of cases, and in 1988, once 
again at the justices’ urging, it elim-
inated almost all of the remaining 
direct appeals to the Supreme Court. 
The Court, freed from mandatory 
appeals and aggressively applying its 
certiorari criteria, has been hearing 
argument in fewer and fewer cases a 
year. In October Term 2011, for ex-
ample, the number of cases decided 
after briefing and oral argument 
reached the historic low of 65 cases.
Not only do these numbers place 
the Supreme Court caseload at his-
toric lows, but, as Judge Richard A. 
Posner has pointed out, when mea-
sured as a proportion of all cases in 
the federal judicial system, the case-
load is vanishingly small. He “com-
pare[s] the percentage just of fed-
eral court cases in which the Court 
granted certiorari in 2004—0.11% 
(64 divided by 56,396)—with the 
corresponding percentage in 1960—
1.6% (60 divided by 3753)” to find 
that “the Court reviewed, in relative 
terms, almost 15 times as many fed-
eral court cases in 1960 as in 2004.”
Put another way, what Frankfurter 
and Landis said in 1928 remains just 
as true today:
Perhaps the decisive factor in the 
history of the Supreme Court 
is its progressive contraction of 
jurisdiction. . . . In contrast with 
the vast expansion of the bounds 
of the inferior federal courts, the 
scope of review by the Supreme 
Court has been steadily narrowed.
Photo of Supreme Court Room (in the Capitol), c. 1894, Wittemann Collection, Library of Congress.
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This “progressive contraction,” 
both of mandatory jurisdiction and 
of the Court’s exercise of its own dis-
cretion to hear cases, has reached a 
point where the concerns expressed 
today about the Supreme Court’s 
workload are unprecedented. Com-
mentators and observers today com-
plain that the Court is not taking 
enough cases and that the justices 
do not work hard enough. In stark 
contrast to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
statements at his confirmation hear-
ings, then-Judge John G. Roberts in-
dicated at his hearings in 2005 that 
he thought there was “room for the 
Court to take more cases.” None-
theless, since his confirmation, the 
Court has not in fact done so. As al-
ready noted, the Court decided only 
65 cases after briefing and argument 
in October Term 2011. Whether 
and how Congress—or the Court it-
self—will ultimately respond to such 
complaints and observations, and 
what the next 125 years will bring, 
remains to be seen. ◆
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James Kent wrote those words in 1826, decrying the fact that more than 600 volumes of English and 
American case reports and treatises 
had been published, but not many 
of them were helpful to the student 
seeking an understanding of the 
common law. “Steady perseverance,” 
to Chancellor Kent, meant setting 
aside more books than were consulted, 
to take control of the “indigestible 
heap of . . . legal authorities.”
The early classes at Chicago-Kent 
College of Law were taught in judges’ 
chambers or in law offices, where 
the library usually belonged to the 
instructor. Students were often free 
to use the books, and sometimes 
could borrow them for short periods 
of time. The trouble was, everyone 
needed the same books. The prob-
lem was underscored when Dean 
Langdell’s case method became the 
dominant means of instruction. 
Many volumes of case reports had to 
To attain a competent knowledge of the common law . . . 
requires steady perseverance, in consequence of the number of 
books which beset and encumber the path of the student.
     —James Kent
125 YEARS OF LAW BOOKS, 1888–2013
Keith Ann Stiverson
Photo of the Law Library of the Library of Congress in the U.S. Capitol, c. 1895, Library of Congress.
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be replaced year after year, because 
the pages where the assigned cases 
appeared were simply thumbed to 
death by students: the casebook was 
born of necessity as much as conve-
nience.
The nineteenth century law 
schools that merged to become Chi-
cago- Kent College of Law had very 
small collections of books, but stu-
dents had access to both the city’s 
public library (founded in 1872) and 
the Newberry Library, a humani-
ties research collection open to the 
public that was established in 1887. 
The only Chicago law library of any 
size was the Chicago Law Institute 
Library, which was incorporated by 
a small group of lawyers in 1857 to 
serve the needs of the city’s grow-
ing legal community. The collection 
consisted of approximately 7,000 
volumes and was housed in the 
Cook County Courthouse, where 
judges, government employees, and 
law students were permitted to use 
the collection at no charge, while lo-
cal practitioners paid an annual fee 
of $100. The Law Institute collection 
eventually served as the basis for the 
Cook County Law Library, which is 
now estimated to have more than 
300,000 volumes.
Law book publishing in the nine-
teenth century was initially based 
in Albany, New York City, Philadel-
phia, and Boston, but Chicago also 
had a share of the industry, includ-
ing E.B. Myers & Co., a bookstore/
office for Lawyers Co-operative 
Publishing Company of New York, 
and the Illinois Book Exchange, 
which provided student textbooks. 
The most famous law bookstore of 
all was “Callaghan’s Three Miles of 
Law Books” at 68 West Washing-
ton Street, which eventually became 
“Miles and Miles of Law Books” in 
later advertisements when its stock 
was replaced after the Great Chicago 
Fire of 1871. Law books were often 
distributed through the publishers’ 
own bookstores, but Callaghan sold 
books from many publishers.
It was in the 1880s that American 
law publishers began to create order 
out of the “indigestible heap” of law 
books that was growing very fast 
as the nation and commerce devel-
oped. By then, case reports had been 
published in the United States for 
approximately 100 years, but not in a 
systematic way until West’s National 
Reporter System began in 1879 with 
the Northwestern Reporter. West 
was the company that established a 
real system for publishing cases, and 
then followed that innovation with 
the American Digest System. Soon 
after the Northwestern Reporter be-
gan, West took over and improved 
the U.S. Digest, which was previously 
published by Little, Brown. West’s 
digests and Key Number System 
enabled lawyers to find what they 
needed in the rapidly-growing sets 
of West reporters. The company then 
answered the needs of lawyers who 
could not afford (and did not want) 
the entire national system when it 
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began publishing state digests and 
reporters.
As West was inventing a sys-
tem to grapple with the burgeon-
ing case law, Frank Shepard was 
inventing the case citator. Shepard’s 
Citations began in 1873 as a service 
in which adhesive labels were sent 
to subscribers who affixed them to 
the pages of published case reports 
so that the lawyer reading the case 
could determine whether the court’s 
decision in the case was still “good 
law” or had been overturned on ap-
peal. Eventually Shepard developed 
a complicated system of abbrevia-
tions to indicate the importance and 
validity of the case so that a reader 
knew if the case could be cited as au-
thority for the statement he wanted 
to make. The awkward method of 
updating (the gummed labels often 
dried up and fell off the pages) didn’t 
work very well, so Shepard began 
publishing his updating system in 
bound volumes keyed to the various 
reporters and updated by paperback 
supplements. The lawyer who needed 
to determine the history or current 
status of a case he was reading could 
simply check by citation. Finally, in 
the 1980s, the Shepard’s Citations 
system became the extremely cur-
rent online citator that lawyers use 
today.
One response to the proliferation 
of cases was the birth of selective 
case reporters with so-called anno-
tations, i.e., an explanation that put 
the case(s) in context and provided a 
narrative to explain the development 
of a particular area of law. It was sim-
ply impossible for most lawyers to 
keep up with the massive number of 
court opinions being published, so 
the idea of highlighting and explain-
ing only the leading cases had real 
merit. The earliest of the annotated 
cases, in the 1880s, were accompa-
nied by short notes; later on, editors 
wrote hundreds of pages to explain 
the development and current state 
of an area of law in multiple juris-
dictions.
Another innovation that came 
from the law book publishers soon 
after the turn of the century was the 
specialized loose-leaf service. The 
first successful one was published by 
Commerce Clearing House in 1913 
after ratification of the Sixteenth 
Amendment created the income 
tax. Soon there were other services 
covering such subjects as trade reg-
ulation and banking, then additional 
areas of law as more publishers en-
tered the field. The most useful of the 
loose-leaf services brought together in 
one publication all of the things that a 
practitioner needed: court opinions, 
rulings, statutes and regulations, as 
well as secondary commentary. Many 
of the services were updated weekly, 
so the lawyer had less reason to worry 
that the information he had was out of 
date. In the 1980s, many lawyers who 
specialized in a particular area of law 
welcomed the new CD-ROM format, 
which made it easy for them to carry 
around their entire law library.
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Judges were not the only busy 
writers; legislatures, both state and 
federal, began to pass more laws to 
deal with the demands of an increas-
ingly complex industrial society. Ses-
sion laws were often published only 
at the end of a session of the legisla-
ture; these, along with the occasional 
statutory digest and the various in-
dexes, were not sufficient to make 
the material available in a timely 
manner. It was increasingly difficult 
to piece together the original statute 
with all of the amendments of later 
years. The Revised Statutes of 1873 
was a temporary solution to the 
problem, but it was 1926 before the 
first publication of the United States 
Code. The Code finally gave lawyers 
access to federal law in a topical ar-
rangement that was updated. The 
official Code is republished every 
six years; the most recent edition 
consists of more than 200,000 pages. 
West began publishing an unofficial 
version of the Code right away, in 
1927, called the United States Code 
Annotated. As everyone knows who 
has done research in federal statutes, 
West did a faster, better job than the 
government of publishing the sup-
plementation necessary to keep the 
Code up to date. Many states also 
began to compile their statutes into 
a topical arrangement with an ex-
tensive index. Some of these com-
pilations provided citations to cases 
or short annotations of the court 
decisions that had construed each 
section of the statute.
No law library could afford to 
collect all of the official statutes and 
court opinions of Federal and state 
governments, let alone the commer-
cial versions of primary material. The 
huge wave of secondary legal publi-
cations that appeared in response 
to the New Deal and the eventual 
specialization of the legal profession 
made it impossible to build a truly 
comprehensive collection. The 600 
volumes of case reports that once 
annoyed Chancellor Kent contin-
ued to multiply until it eventually 
became the behemoth that also in-
cluded thousands of law reviews and 
legal newspapers. Luckily, the tech-
nology we needed and the uniform 
system of legal citation made it pos-
sible to control this enormous mass 
of material, and to simplify the many 
elaborate systems that had been cre-
ated to help the practitioner find the 
law by subject.
The 1970s and 1980s were de-
cades of real achievement in mak-
ing the whole body of law and the 
many secondary sources more read-
ily available in convenient form. The 
Lexis database was followed even-
tually by Westlaw, and the two sys-
tems have dominated the market for 
online legal research ever since, de-
spite weak challenges from smaller 
publishers and from the open ac-
cess movement. The recent entry of 
Bloomberg Law/BNA into the online 
market is the first real challenge to 
the supremacy of Lexis and Westlaw.
Keith Ann Stiverson
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A collection of historical books 
named The Making of Modern Law 
(MOML) was an important con-
tribution to law collections several 
years ago that helped to level the field 
for new academic law libraries that 
had few of the older books. MOML 
is a digital collection of more than 
twenty thousand nineteenth and 
early twentieth century treatises and 
other legal documents that are acces-
sible through Chicago-Kent Library’s 
online catalog. As one flips through 
the pages of this electronic book col-
lection, it is somewhat surprising to 
realize that quite often one is looking 
at images of a print work that was 
once prized by our nineteenth century 
faculty and students. An example is 
Thayer’s A Preliminary Treatise on 
Evidence at the Common Law, pub-
lished at the turn of the last century 
and later added to our library’s print 
collection as the 10,510th volume, a 
work that is still available on a shelf 
in the library, but also accessible as 
a full-text e-book that can be read 
24/7 by clicking a hyperlink.
Now that our huge collections of print volumes are disappearing 
from shelves, what will happen next 
to the academic law book collections 
that took more than a century to 
acquire? One can probably predict 
more offsite storage, more e-books, 
and more use of print-on-demand 
options. What was once known as 
“collection development” in the li-
brary has undergone radical change. 
Acquisition is often temporary, and 
research materials are not automat-
ically added to the library’s perma-
nent collection.
Class poem from The Transcript, 1920, Chicago-Kent’s student yearbook, photo by Emily Barney.
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Many law libraries are returning 
to their roots to make the historical 
materials of their law schools avail-
able. For instance, Chicago-Kent 
Library is starting a project to pre-
serve the law school’s unique his-
torical collections by placing them 
in a digital repository. The images 
will reside in the cloud, rather than 
moldering away, page by page, in a 
dark room. The institutional reposi-
tory will be the permanent home for 
(among other things) the early pub-
lications and videos of and about the 
law school. We will be able to tell the 
descendant of a 1915 graduate where 
to find the online class photograph 
that includes his great-grandfather. 
The nephew of a woman who was 
the class poet many years ago can 
now read her work online, because 
we saved on old student yearbook 
before it disintegrated.
Today’s law student may finish 
her legal education and then go into 
the practice of law without ever using 
a print volume, given the twenty-first 
century reality that online databases 
usually contain everything she needs 
Keith Ann Stiverson is the Director of 
the Library at Chicago-Kent. She received 
her law degree from Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center and her M.S. in Library 
Science from Catholic University. Keith 
Ann was engaged in private practice (mu-
nicipal bonds) for several years in Cincin-
nati before leaving to take a position as 
Special Assistant to the Law Librarian 
at the Library of Congress. She came to 
Chicago-Kent in 2001 from the Univer-
sity of Texas at Austin, where she served 
as Associate Director of the Law Library.
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■ James R. Grossman, et al., eds., The Encyclopedia 
of Chicago (2004).
■ Historical Development of the American Lawyer’s 
Library, 61 Law Libr. J. 440–462 (1968). 
■ Chicago-Kent College of Law, The Transcript 
(student yearbook), 1917–.
for research, and client files are often 
in an electronic knowledge man-
agement system rather than in a 
print file. But if she returns for a law 
school class reunion in a few years, 
hoping to relive her triumph at a law 
student talent show, we hope we’ll 
have a link to the video. ◆
Keith Ann Stiverson
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125 Years of Innovation
A Chronology of Law and Progress at IIT Chicago-Kent
1886
Several law clerks 
receive tutorials in 
Appellate Judge Joseph 
M. Bailey’s chambers 
to prepare for the newly 
instituted Illinois bar 
examination.
1912
Chicago-Kent College 
of Law moves to rented 
space at 116 North 
Michigan Avenue, where 
it remains for the next 
12 years.
1888 1891Emma Baumann 
graduates, becoming 
the first woman to 
earn a law degree from 
Chicago College of Law.
1898
Henry Horner 
graduates, later 
becoming the first 
Jewish governor of 
Illinois (1933–40).
1898/1899
First chapters of 
Lambda Epsilon, later 
Phi Alpha Delta, the 
world’s largest legal 
fraternity, begin at 
Chicago College of 
Law and Kent College 
of Law.
1888
As tutorials evolve 
into formal classes, 
Chicago College of Law 
is established as the 
second law school in 
Illinois.
 
1894
Ida Platt graduates 
with honors, becoming 
the first black woman 
admitted to the Illinois 
bar and the second 
woman of color 
admitted to practice law 
in the United States.
1895
Marshall D. Ewell 
founds Kent College 
of Law, named for 
Chancellor James B. 
Kent, author of the 
influential Commentaries 
on American Law.
1900
Chicago College of 
Law merges with Kent 
College of Law to form 
Chicago-Kent College 
of Law.
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1894
Ida Platt graduates with honors  
from Chicago College of Law, becoming the 
first black woman admitted to the Illinois bar 
and the second woman of color admitted to 
practice law in the United States.
1923
The Chicago Kent 
Review (originally the 
Athenaeum Law Bulletin; 
now the Chicago-
Kent Law Review) 
begins continuous 
publication.
1942–46 
School remains open 
during American 
involvement in World 
War II, with a student 
body roughly a third of 
its normal size. 
1956
Chicago-Kent’s 
Alumni Association 
is re-formed, and the 
law school building 
is expanded and 
made handicapped 
accessible.
1969
Chicago-Kent merges 
with Illinois Institute of 
Technology, becoming 
one of the few U.S. law 
schools affiliated with 
a technical university. 
1924
Chicago-Kent 
purchases the building 
at 10 North Franklin 
Street, which serves 
as its home for the 
next 50 years.
1949
Richard B. Ogilvie 
graduates, later 
becoming governor of 
Illinois (1969–73).
1951
More than 500 alumni 
attend the 65th annual 
homecoming luncheon 
at the Sherman Hotel.
1971
Mary Lee Leahy, the 
law school’s first 
woman professor, joins 
the faculty.
1971
Chicago-Kent 
establishes its 
rigorous trial advocacy 
program, where 
students gain practical 
experience in litigation 
techniques.
1976
Chicago-Kent moves 
from 10 North Franklin 
Street to 77 South 
Wacker Drive.
1977
Chicago-Kent 
establishes a 
continuing legal 
education program.
1972
Emerson Blue, the law 
school’s first African-
American professor, 
joins the faculty.
1970
An issue of the 
Chicago-Kent Law 
Review focuses on 
the work of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit, 
a theme revisited 
annually until 1989.
1970–73
Enrollment rises 
from 460 to 750 
due primarily to the 
high percentage of 
women entering law 
school.
1976
Chicago-Kent opens 
the nation’s first in-
house, fee-generating 
law school clinic.
1978
Chicago-Kent pioneers 
the nation’s first three-
year legal research 
and writing program, 
now emulated at law 
schools nationwide.
1978
The Moot Court Honor 
Society is founded 
to provide practical 
skills training in 
the foundations of 
appellate advocacy.
1969
Chicago-Kent merges with  
Illinois Institute of Technology,  
becoming one of the few  
U.S. law schools affiliated with  
a technical university.
1976
Chicago-Kent opens the  
nation’s first in-house, fee-generating  
law school clinic.
1983
Chicago-Kent establishes the  
Center for Law and Computers,  
becoming the nation’s first law  
school to make computers an integral  
part of studying law.
1981
Chicago-Kent and 
IIT establish a joint 
J.D.-M.B.A. program, 
the first of many joint-
degree options.
1981
Chicago-Kent establishes 
the Graduate Program in 
Taxation and the Graduate 
Program in Financial 
Services Law, the first 
such LL.M. program in the 
United States.
1988
The Chicago-Kent 
team of Joel Daly ’88, 
Lauretta Higgins ’88 
and Peter Roskam 
’89 wins the 13th 
annual National Trial 
Competition.
1990
Chicago-Kent is named 
among the top “up and 
coming” law schools 
by U.S. News & World 
Report.
1983
Chicago-Kent 
establishes the 
Center for Law and 
Computers, becoming 
the nation’s first 
law school to make 
computers an integral 
part of studying law.
1992
Chicago-Kent opens 
the “law school of the 
future” at 565 West 
Adams Street, making 
the state-of-the-art 
building its new home.
1989
Chicago-Kent 
establishes a chapter 
of the Order of the 
Coif, an honorary 
scholastic society that 
encourages excellence 
in legal education.
1996 
Chicago-Kent launches 
the Institute for Law 
and the Workplace, 
a national center 
focusing on laws that 
govern the workplace.
1997
Chicago-Kent and 
other academic units 
of IIT create the 
Institute for Science, 
Law & Technology to 
evaluate emerging 
technologies and their 
impact on society. 
1998
Chicago-Kent receives 
the ISBA’s Access 
to Justice Special 
Recognition Award 
for initiatives that 
enhance access to 
the justice system 
for underserved 
populations.
2002
Chicago-Kent is 
awarded the 2002 
Diversity Award by 
the Council on Legal 
Education Opportunity.
2002 
The Illinois Technology 
Center for Law & the 
Public Interest opens 
at Chicago-Kent, later 
becoming the Center 
for Access to Justice & 
Technology.
1998
Chicago-Kent launches 
the Honors Scholars 
Program for students 
with strong potential to 
shape the profession’s 
direction.
1996
Chicago-Kent is 
named Public Interest 
Law School of the 
Year by the Law 
Student Division of 
the American Bar 
Association.
1997
Chicago-Kent launches 
a student/faculty 
initiative to use 
technology to foster 
the rule of law in 
emerging democracies.
2000
Chicago-Kent creates 
the Institute for Law 
and the Humanities 
to explore the 
relationships between 
law and other 
humanistic disciplines.
2003
Chicago-Kent alums head the  
National Lawyers Association, National  
Hispanic Prosecutors Association,  
Illinois State Bar Association, Chicago Bar  
Association, Women’s Bar Association of Illinois, 
Cook County Bar Association, Illinois  
Judges Association, and Black Women Lawyers’  
Association of Greater Chicago.
2008 
Chicago-Kent becomes the first law school to 
win both the National Trial Competition and 
the National Moot Court Competition in the 
same year. The team of Joshua Jones ’08 and 
Mark Griffin ’08 took the trial competition 
honors; the team of Lalania Gilkey-Johnson ’08, 
Joanna Brinkman ’09 and Rachel Moran ’08 
took the moot court honors.
2007
The Chicago-Kent 
team of Keya Rajput 
’07 and Joshua Jones 
’08 wins the 32nd 
annual National Trial 
Competition.
2003
Chicago-Kent 
establishes the 
country’s first 
LL.M. program 
in international 
intellectual property 
law.
2007
Roy C. Palmer ’62 and 
Susan M. Palmer establish 
the IIT Chicago-Kent 
College of Law/Roy C. 
Palmer Civil Liberties 
Prize to honor scholarship 
exploring the tension 
between civil liberties and 
national security.
2008
Chicago-Kent becomes 
the first law school to 
win both the National 
Trial Competition and 
the National Moot 
Court Competition in 
the same year.
2010 
The Oyez Project, a 
multimedia archive 
devoted to the U.S. 
Supreme Court and 
its work, moves to 
Chicago-Kent.
2007
Chicago-Kent and other 
IIT units create the 
Center for Diabetes 
Research and Policy 
to advocate for 
people with diabetes 
and to develop new 
treatments and 
preventions.
2009
The Chicago-Kent team 
of Brody Dawson ’09, 
Andrew Booth ’09 
and Betsy Gates ’09 
wins the 59th annual 
National Moot Court 
Competition.
2003 
Chicago-Kent alums 
head the National 
Lawyers Association, 
National Hispanic 
Prosecutors 
Association, Illinois 
State Bar Association, 
Chicago Bar 
Association, Women’s 
Bar Association of 
Illinois, Cook County 
Bar Association, 
Illinois Judges 
Association, and Black 
Women Lawyers’ 
Association of Greater 
Chicago.
2011
Chicago-Kent 
establishes the 
Institute on the 
Supreme Court of 
the United States to 
promote education 
about the Court 
and its role in our 
constitutional system 
of government.
2012 
Chicago-Kent launches 
the Institute for 
Compliance, dedicated 
to preparing students 
for careers in financial 
compliance.
2012 
Chicago-Kent creates the 
Center for Information, 
Society and Policy to 
address privacy and 
information security issues 
raised by information 
technologies. 
2011 
Chicago-Kent 
establishes its first 
endowed chair, named 
in honor of Professor 
Ralph Brill, and installs 
Professor Adrian 
Walters of Nottingham 
Trent University.
2010
Chicago-Kent 
establishes the Jury 
Center, later renamed 
after Justice John Paul 
Stevens.
2013 
Chicago-Kent opens 
the Center for 
Empirical Studies of 
Intellectual Property 
to promote application 
of quantitative and 
qualitative social 
science methods 
to questions of 
innovation and 
creativity. 
2013
108
Susan Johanne Adams
Professor of Legal Research and Writing 
Lori B. Andrews
Distinguished Professor of Law 
Bernadette Atuahene
Associate Professor of Law 
Kimberly D. Bailey
Assistant Professor of Law 
Katharine K. Baker
Professor of Law 
Felice Batlan
Associate Professor of Law 
William A. Birdthistle
Associate Professor of Law 
Alexander A. Boni-Saenz
Assistant Professor of Law
Fred P. Bosselman
Professor of Law Emeritus  
Ralph Brill
Professor of Law 
Evelyn Brody
Professor of Law 
Bartram S. Brown
Professor of Law 
Gerald Brown
Senior Instructor 
Christopher J. Buccafusco
Associate Professor of Law 
Howard S. Chapman
Professor of Law 
Sungjoon Cho
Professor of Law 
Lew Collens
Professor of Law Emeritus and President Emeritus, 
Illinois Institute of Technology 
Richard J. Conviser
Professor of Law 
Daniel T. Coyne
Clinical Professor of Law 
Elizabeth De Armond
Professor of Legal Research and Writing 
Jonathan Decatorsmith
Clinical Assistant Professor of Law 
Rhonda E. de Freitas
Clinical Assistant Professor of Law 
Howard C. Eglit
Professor of Law 
Suzanne Ehrenberg
Professor of Legal Research and Writing 
David A. Erickson
Senior Instructor 
David J. Gerber
Distinguished Professor of Law 
Douglas Wm. Godfrey
Professor of Legal Research and Writing 
Jerry Goldman
Research Professor of Law 
Richard J. Gonzalez
Clinical Professor of Law 
Sanford N. Greenberg
Professor of Legal Research and Writing 
Vivien C. Gross
Clinical Professor of Law 
IIT Chicago-Kent Faculty
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Philip N. Hablutzel
Professor of Law 
Sarah K. Harding
Associate Professor of Law 
Vinay Harpalani
Visiting Assistant Professor of Law 
Heather F. Harper
Clinical Assistant Professor of Law 
Edward C. Harris
Associate Professor for  
International LL.M. Programs 
Steven L. Harris
Professor of Law 
Todd Haugh
Visiting Assistant Professor of Law 
Steven J. Heyman
Professor of Law 
Kari L. Aamot Johnson
Professor of Legal Research and Writing 
Cherish M. Keller
Assistant Professor of Legal Research  
and Writing for LL.M. Programs 
Pamela Kentra
Clinical Professor of Law 
Richard S. Kling
Clinical Professor of Law 
Valerie Gutmann Koch
Visiting Assistant Professor of Law 
Edward Kraus
Clinical Professor of Law 
Harold J. Krent
Dean and Professor of Law 
Gary S. Laser
Associate Professor of Law 
Laurie E. Leader
Clinical Professor of Law 
Edward Lee
Professor of Law 
Martin H. Malin
Professor of Law 
Nancy S. Marder
Professor of Law
Ana Mendez Mencini
Clinical Assistant Professor of Law 
Sheldon H. Nahmod
Distinguished Professor of Law 
Henry H. Perritt, Jr.
Professor of Law 
Mickie A. Piatt
Associate Professor of Law 
César F. Rosado Marzán
Assistant Professor of Law 
Mark D. Rosen
Professor of Law 
David S. Rudstein
Professor of Law
Christopher W. Schmidt
Assistant Professor of Law  
David L. Schwartz
Associate Professor of Law 
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Carolyn Shapiro
Associate Professor of Law 
Jeffrey G. Sherman
Professor of Law Emeritus 
Stephen D. Sowle
Senior Lecturer
Michael I. Spak
Professor of Law 
Ronald W. Staudt
Professor of Law 
Joan E. Steinman
Distinguished Professor of Law 
Stephanie M. Stern
Associate Professor of Law 
Margaret G. Stewart
Professor of Law Emeritus
Keith Ann Stiverson
Senior Lecturer 
Kent Streseman
Associate Professor of Appellate Advocacy 
Mary Rose Strubbe
Professor of Legal Research and Writing 
Patti Sudendorf
Instructor 
A. Dan Tarlock
Distinguished Professor of Law 
Adrian J. Walters
Ralph L. Brill Professor of Law 
Richard Warner
Professor of Law 
Richard W. Wright
Distinguished Professor of Law 
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Thomas A. Demetrio ’73, Chair
Corboy & Demetrio PC
Laurel G. Bellows
The Bellows Law Group
Gerald L. Bepko ’65
Indiana University School of Law–Indianapolis
Peter J. Birnbaum ’83
Attorneys’ Title Guaranty Fund Inc.
Penny T. Brown ’79
Lewis M. Collens
IIT President Emeritus
The Honorable Barbara J. Disko ’73
Circuit Court of Cook County (retired)
Vincent L. DiTommaso ’82
DiTommaso & Lubin
Ronald H. Filler
New York Law School
Michael P. Galvin ’78
Harrison Street Capital LLC
Jeffery T. Grade (B.S. ’66)
J & L Hospitality Group LLC
Harold S. Handelsman
The Pritzker Organization
Frances P. Kao ’92
Anne G. Kimball
Edwards Wildman Palmer LLP
Theodore L. Koenig ’83
Monroe Capital LLC
Barry S. Maram ’71
Shefsky & Froelich Ltd.
Michael M. Marick ’82
Meckler Bulger Tilson Marick & Pearson LLP
The Honorable Edward F. Masters ’72
Edward F. Masters, Attorney at Law
Steven T. Naumann ’88
Exelon Corporation
Victoria L. Noonan ’84
Tishman Speyer Properties
Steven M. Odre ’77
Ward Parkinson ’97
Ovonyx Inc.
The Honorable Ilana  
Diamond Rovner ’66
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Robert M. Sarnoff ’68
Sarnoff & Baccash
John R. Schmidt
Mayer Brown LLP
Bernard R. Tresnowski ’98
Priscilla A. (Pam) Walter
Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP
Robert J. Washlow ’70
Bay West Management LLC
Degee Wilhelm ’02
Joan C. Wing ’74
George A. Zelcs ’79
Korein Tillery  
IIT Chicago-Kent Board of Overseers
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Paul A. Miller ’00, President
Office of the Special Deputy Receiver
Tarek A. Fadel ’03, Past President
AdaptiGroup LLC
Michael Brown ’83
Clark Hill PLC
The Honorable Eileen O’Neill Burke ’90
Circuit Court of Cook County
Kevin Connor ’87
Illinois Department of Financial &  
Professional Regulation
Terrence T. Creamer ’90
Franczek Radelet PC
Ann M. Cresce ’94
Hong Kong Mercantile Exchange
Scott M. Curran ’01
William J. Clinton Foundation
Symeon K. Davis ’97
Hobson Bernardino & Davis LLP
Karen Dixon ’97
Meckler Bulger Tilson Marick & Pearson LLP
Paul J. Ferak ’00
Greenberg Traurig
William T. Gibbs ’04
Corboy & Demetrio PC
Robert A. Heap ’83
Kuhn Heap & Monson
Seth A. Herkowitz ’07, MBA ’07
Steve’s Deli
Barbara D. Klein ’78
Barbara D. Klein & Associates
Bruce M. Kohen ’79
Retired
Charles J. Masters ’74
Charles J. Masters Ltd.
James J. Morici Jr. ’79 
Morici Figlioli & Associates
Mary T. Nicolau Smith ’85
Smith/Nicolau PC
Kerry R. Peck ’78
Peck Bloom LLC
Jason Sposeep ’03
Schiller DuCanto & Fleck LLP
Denise Y. Staniec ’84
Law Offices of Denise Y. Staniec
Alexander Kakabadse ’14
SBA Representative
ex-officio/presidents emeriti
Daniel S. Kirschner ’98
Corboy & Demetrio PC
John G. Locallo ’86
Amari & Locallo
Kevin E. O’Reilly ’92
Law Offices of Kevin E. O’Reilly
Robert A. Surrette ’97
McAndrews, Held & Malloy Ltd.
IIT Chicago-Kent Alumni Board of Directors
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